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Introductory Chapter 
 
Worry is a psychological phenomenon that is experienced by most people at some point in 
their lives (Davey, Hampton, Farrell & Davidson, 1992). Studies that have attempted to 
quantify worry have indicated that it occurs on a continuum ranging from occasional to 
frequent, fleeting to intense, and uncomplicated to challenging, with a wide selection of 
participants providing the full range of scores and possible responses using different 
measures of worry (Meyer, Miller, Metzger & Borkovec, 1990; Molina & Borkovec, 1994; 
Tallis, Eysenck & Mathews, 1992; Tallis, Davey & Capuzzo, 1994). As the frequency and 
intensity of worry increases, it appears that worry can become more and more problematic, 
impacting on individuals’ lives in different areas, such as impairments in concentration, 
disturbed sleep and for example loss of social confidence. Similarly, increasing levels of 
worry are associated with a wide range of mental health conditions, with some suggesting 
that “worry may be one of the most prominent symptoms of those experiencing psychological 
disturbance in the general population” (MacLeod, Williams & Bekerian, 1991, p478). 
Individuals who primarily report levels of worry that are frequent, intense and problematic 
will tend to attract a diagnosis of Generalized Anxiety Disorder (GAD). This has led to a 
significant amount of research being conducted into the relationship between worry and 
GAD. 
 
In spite of worry appearing to occur along frequency, intensity and impact continua (any 
further use within the thesis of the term continuum is intended to refer to these three 
dimensions), the close association between GAD and worry seems to have led to an “implicit 
assumption” (Ruscio, 2002, p378) in much of the worry literature that there exists only two 
forms of worry: ‘normal worry’, which is understandable, reasonable, relatively 
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unproblematic and experienced by the majority of people; and ‘pathological worry’, which is 
persistent, catastrophic, highly distressing and typically experienced by those with a 
diagnosis of GAD. It is felt that this assumption has led to research which has tended to focus 
on either one or the other form of worry, and has failed to explore and understand worry as a 
phenomenon that exists on a continuum (Ruscio, 2002; Ruscio & Borkovec, 2004). 
 
In addition, there is also an apparent dominance of quantitative studies which have explored 
worry. These studies are largely questionnaire-based or experimental in design. These studies 
are also based upon a positivist standpoint, with worry positioned as a discrete and 
measurable ‘symptom’. In contrast, there is a noticeable lack of qualitative research in the 
field of worry. Qualitative research allows rich and detailed narratives to be obtained and 
analysed, leading to findings that have depth, subtlety and complexity that quantitative 
research is often unable to provide. Furthermore, studies that utilise qualitative 
methodologies strive to minimise the influence of prior assumptions about the research area, 
or at least make transparent any bias that may exist. 
 
The overall aim of the current thesis is to explore the experience of worry as it is revealed by 
qualitative research methodologies, in order to develop an enhanced or alternative 
understanding as to why worry can become problematic. Since worry appears to exist on a 
continuum, as described above, it was felt that findings from studies investigating worry at 
any point on the continuum could provide an insight into the problematic potential of worry. 
In order to remain open to a broad range of meaning, worry is loosely defined as a focus on 
potential future threat and on the resources available to cope with that threat (Barlow, 2002). 
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Chapter one consists of a systematic literature review. The rationale for conducting this 
review is that qualitative research may provide a rich perspective on the phenomenological 
characteristics of worry, which may further elucidate why worry can develop to problematic 
levels. The aims of this review are: a) to identify and describe the qualitative research which 
has focused upon the subjective experience of worry, b) to synthesise the phenomenological 
characteristics of worry as revealed by these qualitative studies. In order to set the context for 
the review, a summary is first provided of the prominent theories of worry that have been 
advanced and the quantitative research that underpins them. The findings of the studies 
selected for the review are presented and synthesised, followed by a discussion of the overall 
findings (including the theoretical and clinical implications). The conclusion from the review 
indicates that the quality and transparency of the selected qualitative studies was low, which 
appeared to be the result of a comprehensive qualitative methodology not being utilised in 
each case. If this issue was addressed, such studies might provide an enhanced insight into 
why worry can become problematic. 
 
Chapter two consists of an empirical paper. The empirical paper builds on the findings of the 
systematic review, in which a lack of comprehensive qualitative studies exploring the 
subjective experience of worry was identified. The aims of the empirical paper are as follows: 
a) to explore how worry is perceived, characterised and understood using a robust qualitative 
methodology, and b) to develop a model of worry that might explain how or why worry can 
become a problematic experience. A grounded theory methodology was chosen for this study 
due to its emphasis on exploring human behaviour and processes (Charmaz, 2006a) and 
because it is the only qualitative methodology that specifically enables a model to be 
developed of the domain under investigation. In an attempt to counter and minimise the 
positivist bias that already appears to exist in the worry literature, the social constructivist 
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variant of grounded theory was utilised, as developed by Kathy Charmaz (2000; 2006a). 
Within this methodology, any resulting theory is intended to offer and emphasize an 
understanding of processes, rather than provide an explanation (Charmaz, 2006a), as might 
be seen in quantitative research or in positivist variants of grounded theory, such as espoused 
by Glaser (1998) or Strauss and Corbin (1998). The approach is underpinned by an 
assumption that “any theoretical rendering offers an interpretative portrayal of the studied 
world, not an exact picture of it” (Charmaz, 2006a, p10). On this basis, it is clear that 
constructivist grounded theory “lies squarely within the interpretative tradition” (Charmaz, 
2006a, p130). A transdiagnostic clinical sample was chosen for the study from primary and 
secondary care adult mental health services. Since worry is often reported by individuals with 
a variety of mental health diagnoses, recruitment was not limited to those diagnosed with 
GAD. Instead, participants were selected according to whether they reported frequent and 
intense worry that impacted on their lives. It was hoped that these people would be able to 
provide the richest narratives about worry (Bryant & Charmaz, 2007), particularly how or 
why it appeared to have become problematic for them. The findings from the empirical study 
are presented and discussed in relation to previous research and any novel aspects are 
highlighted. Clinical implications of the study are described, along with limitations that were 
identified after a period of reflection. 
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Chapter I 
 
 
Literature Review 
 
 
 
A review of the qualitative research conducted into the subjective experience of worry 
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Abstract 
The purpose of this review is to identify and summarise qualitative research focusing on the 
subjective experience of worry. The majority of research to date has focussed on quantitative 
measures of worry which limit participants’ responses to ratings on pre-defined questionnaire 
items. In summarising open ended subjective studies about the experience of worry, this 
review aims to identify phenomenological aspects of the experience of worry that may further 
advance theory development. Findings are summarised. The following key qualitative themes 
were identified, a) control over worry, b) value assessments of worry, c) perceived causes of 
worry and d) cognitive features of worry. However, all qualitative studies identified by the 
review were lacking in quality, transparency and/or richness. It is recommended that further 
research be conducted which utilise qualitative methodologies involving rigorous and 
transparent processes. 
 
Introduction 
The term worry has been part of the English language for at least the last four hundred years. 
However, the concept of worry did not initially attract much research in the field of 
psychology, mainly because it was viewed to be epiphenomena and therefore not relevant for 
investigation (Davey & Tallis, 1994; O’Neill, 1985; Purdon & Harrington, 2006). Worry 
became a focus of psychological research during the 1970’s with the publication of a number 
of studies (Breznitz, 1971; Deffenbacher & Deitz, 1978; Girodo & Stein, 1978; Janis, 1971; 
Morris & Liebert, 1970). A research group led by Tom Borkevec began to explore the 
experience of worry, resulting in a landmark paper (Borkovec, Robinson, Pruzinsky & 
DePree, 1983) that provided one of the first working definitions of worry, as a “chain of 
thoughts and images, negatively affect-laden and relatively uncontrollable” (Borkovec et al, 
1983, p10). Not long after, ‘excessive worry’ was included as one of the necessary criteria for 
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a diagnosis of Generalised Anxiety Disorder (GAD) in DSM-III-R (American Psychiatric 
Association, 1987). GAD refers to individuals experiencing anxiety about a broad range of 
events or activities. In addition to GAD, worry is also a prominent feature of many other 
anxiety disorders (Brown, Antony & Barlow, 1992; Davey, Tallis & Capuzzo, 1996). One 
estimate has suggested that worry occurs in approximately 40% to 60% of anxiety 
presentations (Dugas, Freeston & Ladouceur, 1997). The relatively high association of worry 
with a range of mental disorders highlights the significance of this phenomenon for 
understanding mental health difficulties. 
 
There are a number of studies that provide some insight into the prevalence of non-clinical 
worry. Among ‘non-pathological’ worriers, 38% stated that they worried at least once per day 
(Tallis, Davey & Capuzzo, 1994), while a group of non-anxious individuals reported that they 
worried on average for 18.2% of each day over the course of a particular month (Craske, 
Rapee, Jackel & Barlow, 1989). A study of worry in older adults indicated that “15% of any 
elderly sample might reliably be considered worriers” (Wisocki, 1994, p257). Among 
children, 68.9% of participants reported worrying occasionally (Muris, Meesters, 
Merckelbach, Sermon & Zwakhalen, 1998), while in a different study, 15% appeared to 
suffer from excessive worry (Bell-Dolan, Last & Strauss, 1990). Excessive worry is a 
necessary feature of the diagnosis of GAD; therefore prevalence rates will provide some 
indication about the extent of clinical levels of worry in the general population. Studies 
investigating the lifetime prevalence for GAD in a number of different countries suggest that 
it ranges from 1.4% to 8.9% among working age adults (Brown, 1997; Holaway, Rodebaugh 
& Heimberg, 2006), while the prevalence appears to be lower among children (Cartwright-
Hatton, 2006) and those over the age of 65 (Wetherell, 2006). Among women, the lifetime 
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prevalence has been reported as being as high as 5.8%, compared to 2.8% in men (Newman, 
Llera, Erickson, Przeworski & Castonguay, 2013). 
 
The ubiquity of worry and its apparent link with common mental health difficulties indicates 
that conducting a review of what is understood about the experience of worry would be an 
important and valuable exercise. However, the majority of research published to date has 
been quantitative in nature, with few studies appearing to utilise a qualitative methodology. 
The predominance of quantitative research in the field of worry requires that the ‘defining 
characteristics’ of worry be operationalised so they can be quantified and assessed. From this, 
a number of theories of worry have been developed and tested, the most prominent of which 
are summarised below. The following summary also aims to highlight the quantitative 
research that appears to underpin each theory. 
 
Theories of Worry 
Cognitive Avoidance Theory. The cognitive avoidance theory (Borkovec, 1994; 
Borkovec, Alcaine & Behar, 2004; Borkovec & Roemer, 1995) was one of the first attempts 
to explain how problematic levels of worry thinking developed and was maintained. The 
theory posits that when individuals worry, they are not actually fully engaged with the 
perceived threat that acts as the trigger for worry. It is hypothesised that chronic worriers 
cognitively ‘dance’ around the imagined threat, thereby not exposing themselves to the full 
imagery or depth of processing that would be involved in ‘normal thinking’ about a threating 
trigger. In the short-term, exposure to a threatening experience is avoided and thus worry 
thinking is negatively reinforced as a coping strategy. However, in the long-term, without full 
engagement, emotional processing fails to take place and the association of vulnerability and 
distress with the target of the worry persists. The empirical support for this theory 
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predominantly involves quantitative studies which indicated less emotional imagery 
(Borkovec & Inz, 1990) and reduced cardiovascular response (Borkovec, 1994; Borkovec, 
Lyonfields, Wiser & Deihl, 1993) during and after the ‘induction’ of worry states. A 
subsequent study explored individuals understanding of the purpose of worry (Borkovec & 
Roemer, 1995). Individuals who worried excessively strongly endorsed the idea that it 
distracted them from more emotionally distressing topics. Although this study could 
potentially have utilised a qualitative design, participants were asked to provide numerical 
ratings for reasons that were “suggested by theory and by reports of our former GAD clients” 
(Borkovec & Roemer, 1995, p26). It is the analysis of the rich and complex data contained in 
these client reports that would be extremely informative from a qualitative perspective, but 
unfortunately this was not published. 
 
Intolerance of Uncertainty Theory. Another significant theory argues that worry is 
motivated and maintained by an individual’s dispositional intolerance of uncertainty (Koerner 
& Dugas, 2006), which is believed to stem from specific beliefs about uncertainty, for 
example that it is unpleasant or stressful. This intolerance is believed to cause and interact 
with a particular style of problem orientation, which involves heightened emotional, 
cognitive and behavioural vigilance towards the identification of potential threats. Due to 
specific beliefs about its ability to resolve uncertainty, worry is then utilised as a way of 
coping with anticipated threats. This is further reinforced, positively and negatively, by 
worry’s perceived role either a) in the intermittent successful negotiation of an actual threat, 
or b) the failure of threats to actually arise. The research linked to this theory analysed scores 
provided to items that measured individuals’ tolerance for uncertainty and their beliefs about 
how much worry was able to reduce uncertainty (Dugas et al, 1997; Freeston, Rheaume, 
Letarte, Dugas & Ladouceur, 1994). The questionnaire items were generated from sources 
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such as “the author’s clinical experience with worriers and GAD patients” (Freeston et al, 
1994, p793). There was no opportunity to understand and audit how the items constructed 
were specifically developed. Again, there is no reason why the areas investigated would not 
be revealed by a qualitative exploration of worry if they were significant for chronic worriers. 
Furthermore, such research might allow a deeper appreciation and elaboration of the key 
factors associated with the onset, development, progression, maintenance and meaning of 
worry. 
 
Metacognitive Model of Worry. The metacognitive model (Wells, 2006) 
understands the development and maintenance of worry within a framework of self-
regulation, that is, that there are cognitive structures and processes whose function is to guide 
and regulate cognitive behaviour. Two specific types of belief are identified that are felt to 
explain problematic worry development and maintenance, namely positive and negative 
metacognitive beliefs of worry. Positive metacognitive beliefs of worry are those associated 
with protocols and strategies to engage with worry, such as that it will protect, warn or 
motivate them. However, the theory also emphasises the central role of negative 
metacognitive beliefs about worry, i.e. that worry is uncontrollable and/or dangerous, which 
is believed to escalate worry to pathological levels. These negative metacognitive beliefs, or 
‘meta-worry’, are believed to cause not only increased anxiety, but perhaps more importantly, 
attempts to limit and suppress worry through a variety of maladaptive and ultimately 
unsuccessful strategies, thus reinforcing the metacognitive belief that worry is uncontrollable. 
The metacognitive model of worry is mainly based upon questionnaire studies that have 
focussed on the extent to which positive and negative beliefs about worry are supported by 
those who worry excessively (Cartwright-Hatton & Wells, 1997; Wells, 1995; 2005). The 
development of the questionnaires used in the studies was, at least in part, influenced by first-
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hand accounts of worriers, such as transcripts from therapy sessions with GAD patients 
(Cartwright-Hatton & Wells, 1997; Wells, 2005). Although a thorough description is 
provided of the questionnaire validation process, as with the previous theories, there is no 
indication as to how the patient transcripts were analysed to arrive at the individual 
questionnaire items.  
 
The Mood-As-Input Hypothesis. The mood-as-input hypothesis (Davey, 2006; 
Davey, Startup, MacDonald, Jenkins & Paterson, 2004; Startup & Davey, 2001; 2003) 
attempts to map the mechanisms at work during worry episodes, in order to explain its 
potentially perseverative nature. The mood-as-input hypothesis proposes that worrying is 
essentially a problem-solving process that is stuck in a loop. Problem-solving is purported to 
involve the generation of solutions over a period of time determined by, among other things, 
the ‘stop-rules’ utilised and whether the individual is in a positive or negative mood. Two 
types of ‘stop-rules’ that the model concentrates on are ‘feel-like-continuing’ and ‘as-many-
as-possible’. It is when an individual is in a negative mood and adopts the ‘as-many-as-
possible’ stop rule that it is hypothesised problematic worrying ensues. This is because the 
individual uses their mood as a guide to whether they have identified a satisfactory outcome, 
with a negative mood indicating that this has not occurred. With an accompanying ‘as-many-
as-possible’ stop rule, the individual will then continue catastrophising, in a perseverative 
manner. Support for this theory generally involves experimental studies which observed how 
much worry occurs following mood induction experiments and the use of different ‘stop-
rules’ (Startup & Davey, 2001, 2003). Furthermore, the theory looks to research exploring 
endorsement ratings for positive beliefs about worry (Borkovec & Roemer, 1995; Davey et 
al, 1996; Wells, 1995) to provide support for the hypothesis that chronic worriers use ‘as-
many-as-possible’ rules due to the stronger endorsement of beliefs in the efficacy of worry. 
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Although one of these studies appeared to make an attempt at utilising a qualitative approach 
(Davey et al, 1996), the design meant that there was a high chance that the responses to the 
open-ended questionnaire items were strongly influenced by the quantitative component of 
the same study. Responses were analysed using content analysis, which produced results that 
only grazed the surface of participants’ narratives. 
 
Contrast Avoidance Model of Worry. This relatively recent model has been 
described as the ‘contrast avoidance model of worry’ (Newman and Llera, 2011; Llera & 
Newman, 2014). Here it is suggested that individuals who worry to a significant level are by 
nature more sensitive to contrasts in emotion. The theory states that since worry can cause 
negative emotions, these individuals then engage in excessive worry in order to generate 
significant levels of negative affect and in turn avoid the ‘shock’ of a future negative event 
(whether it actually occurs or not). Worry is then positively and negatively reinforced by the 
actual or perceived avoidance of a feared negative contrast in emotions. The authors of the 
model drew upon studies which showed greater emotional reactivity during and after 
episodes of worry, compared to prior levels, by measuring heart-rate (Brosschot, Van Dijk & 
Thayer, 2007), cortisol levels (Schlotz, Hellhammer, Schulz & Stone, 2004), skin 
conductance level (Stapinski, Abbott & Rapee, 2010) and vagal tone (Llera & Newman, 
2010). Studies also compared subjective levels of emotions (Davey, Hampton, Farrell & 
Davidson, 1992; Llera & Newman, 2014; Llera & Newman, 2010; Meyer et al, 1990). 
However these involved participants providing quantitative ratings rather than descriptive 
accounts of how their moods changed from one condition to another. A qualitative approach, 
or at least a qualitative component could potentially have enabled a deeper appreciation of the 
impact of worry for individuals in these studies. 
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Summary 
All of the above theories recognise the existence of similar factors that may be involved in 
the maintenance of worry. For example, the idea that individuals hold specific beliefs about 
worry is referenced not only in the metacognitive model, but also in the cognitive avoidance, 
contrast avoidance and intolerance of uncertainty theories. Here beliefs that worry facilitates 
either the avoidance of distressing triggers, contrasts in emotion or uncertainty are considered 
to be present. Also, in the mood-as-input hypothesis, positive beliefs about worry are 
considered to underlie the use of the ‘as-many-as-possible’ stop-rule. However each theory 
places greater emphasis on particular features that are felt to be the sine qua non of worry, 
certainly when it reaches problematic levels. For the contrast avoidance model, the critical 
feature is a lack of emotional processing; for the intolerance of uncertainty model, it is an 
aversion to uncertainty and its perceived consequences; for the mood-as-input hypothesis, the 
interaction of negative mood and the ‘as-many-as-possible’ stop rule is deemed crucial; for 
the metacognitive model, meta-beliefs about worry take prominence; and finally, the contrast 
avoidance theory hypothesises that a fear of emotional contrast is central to the development 
and maintenance of worry.  
 
Of late, there has been a move to position worry within the general domain of negative 
repetitive thought, alongside rumination (Ehring & Watkins, 2008; Ehring, Zetsche, 
Weidacker, Wahl, Schonfeld & Ehlers, 2011; Segerstrom, Tsao, Alden & Craske, 2000; 
Watkins, 2008). In this context, the focus has shifted in an attempt to discover the common 
factor (or factors) that unifies this type of thought and explain how it is maintained. 
Nonetheless, even when worry is conceptualised in this way, it appears that a quantitative 
approach dominates, with little attention given to qualitative methodologies (Watkins, 2008).  
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There are distinct advantages to qualitative research, particularly in relation to the openness 
of the research process through a variety of data collection methods, such as semi-structured 
interviews. In this way, participants are able to reflect and expand upon their experiences 
fully and the richness and depth of meaning and phenomenology contained within their 
stories is made accessible. Qualitative methodologies  also pay particular attention to 
researcher bias, reducing, or at least taking into consideration, the potential impact of pre-
existing assumptions about the domain under investigation. The value in identifying 
qualitative research which has been conducted into the field of worry is that a synthesis of the 
findings from these studies may enhance or potentially challenge the current understanding of 
the experience of worry and how it can develop to problematic levels. 
 
A number of the aforementioned quantitative studies indicate that worry may occur on a 
continuum, in terms of the frequency, intensity and impact it can have on individuals’ lives. 
Qualitative research conducted with individuals who report worry at the upper end of the 
continuum is likely to be the most informative as to how worry can develop to levels that are 
described as problematic. This is because those individuals are likely to have first-hand 
experience of the problems worry can cause. However, it is still possible that qualitative 
research that focuses on the experience of worry at any point across the continuum may 
provide valuable information. As such, the current review includes studies that adopt a 
qualitative approach to understanding the experience of worry at any level. For the purposes 
of this review, worry is defined as a focus upon potential future threat and the resources 
available to cope with that threat (Barlow, 2002). 
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Research Question 
 
What are the key phenomenological characteristics of worry identified in qualitative studies 
exploring worry at any point on the continuum 
 
Aims 
This review aims to: a) identify and describe the qualitative research that has been conducted 
into the subjective experience of worry at any point on the continuum b) to synthesise the 
phenomenological characteristics of worry as revealed by these qualitative studies 
 
Methodology 
Search strategy 
An initial scoping search was conducted to identify terms that would be most likely to 
retrieve relevant studies. This led to the following search algorithm being utilised: worry* IN 
Title AND (attitude* OR comprehen* OR aware* OR think* OR thought* OR explor* OR 
view* OR characteri* OR underst* OR perceiv* OR perception* OR experien* OR feel* OR 
belie* OR qualit* OR descri* OR nature OR propert* OR account*) IN Title OR (qualitative 
IN (Abstract OR Keywords OR Major Subject Heading)) OR qualitative research IN MeSH. 
This algorithm was run in a number of electronic databases (MedLine, PsychInfo, 
PsychArticles, Scopus, Web of Knowledge, CINAHL Plus, The Cochrane Library and the 
National Research Register) which were chosen due to their relevance to the research 
question. In addition, reference lists from prominent books, reviews and articles in the field 
of worry, as well as reference lists from papers selected for this review, were hand-searched. 
Studies were included that incorporated a qualitative approach to exploring and analysing the 
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experience of worry. Only papers that were published in English language were screened for 
selection. Unpublished research was excluded from the literature search. 
 
Titles and abstracts from all studies generated from the above search strategy were screened 
by the author. Any studies that met the inclusion criteria, or where there was uncertainty, 
were selected to be reviewed in full. Full-text copies of these papers were sourced and 
examined in detail to determine their relevance to the research question, and any that did not 
meet the inclusion criteria were removed prior to the data extraction stage. 
 
Data Extraction 
Studies that were confirmed as being appropriate for inclusion were read a number of times 
and a standardised data extraction form was used to pull out the key features for easier 
comparison and integration. Findings were extracted based on their relevance to the research 
question and where possible, participants’ words were used to substantiate identified themes. 
 
Search Results 
The search of electronic databases produced 1296 results, and after duplicates were removed, 
this was reduced to 547 results. The hand-search of key books, articles and reviews generated 
a further 50 new studies, giving a total of 597 references. The screening process resulted in 
the identification of 24 potentially relevant studies. The majority of references that were 
excluded fell into a number categories: quantitative studies related to health and risk, studies 
exploring correlations between measures of worrying and other variables, quantitative studies 
exploring questionnaire measures linked to worrying, experimental studies which artificially 
manipulated aspects of worrying and finally studies that focussed purely on topics of worry 
content. The 24 studies were reviewed in full. A further 12 were excluded as they either did 
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not actually contain a qualitative component (despite being indicated by the abstract). Figure 
1.1 provides a visual representation of the search process and outcomes.  
 
 
 
Figure 1.1 Process involved in identifying and screening studies 
 
 
  
1296 results 
547 results 
749 duplicates removed 
597 results 
50 articles identified 
from hand-searching 
abstracts screened 
24 articles 
full text reviewed 
12 articles used 
in review 
Initial search of databases 
573 studies excluded 
12 studies excluded 
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Results 
Study Characteristics 
Six of the studies used a mixed methods approach. The other six studies were purely 
qualitative. The quantitative components of the six mixed methods studies comprised one 
experimental study, one structured interview with closed questions, two questionnaire 
administration studies and two questionnaire development studies. The qualitative designs of 
the mixed methods studies and qualitative studies involved structured and semi-structured 
interviews, focus groups, questionnaires using open questions, the completion of diaries and 
the generation of a stream of consciousness in a laboratory setting. Table 1.1 summarises the 
main characteristics of the twelve studies included in the review. 
 
Nine of the selected studies focused explicitly upon the experience of worry, and recruited 
participants on the basis of reported anxiety and worry levels, using measures such as the 
GAD Questionnaire (Roemer, Borkovec, Posa & Borkovec, 1995), the Worry Domains 
Questionnaire (Tallis, Davey & Bond, 1994) and the Penn State Worry Questionnaire (Meyer 
et al, 1990). Of these, three involved a child population, with ages ranging from 8 to 13 and 
sample sizes ranging from 89 to 193; five recruited participants from a university population, 
with sample sizes ranging from 40 to 128; one study recruited adult participants from a 
clinical and non-clinical population, with a sample size of 88. The remaining three studies 
that were selected for the review did not specifically aim to investigate the experience of 
worry, although this topic emerged through the analysis process. These studies recruited 
populations, such as Swedish ambulance drivers and community members from a district in 
Papua New Guinea, with sample sizes ranging from 25 to 84.
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Table 1.1 Characteristics and key findings of studies selected for the review 
 
Study Aims Method Qualitative 
Methodology 
Sample Characteristics Key Findings 
Turner & 
Wilson 
(2010) 
To replicate studies conducted 
with adults, testing the mood-
as-input hypothesis, using 
child participants. 
Mixed: Quant – 
Experimental; Qual – 
Semi-structured 
interviews 
Thematic 
Analysis 
n=68; School children; 48 
girls, 20 boys; Age range 11-
13; Mean age – 11.87 
Study provided evidence for the mood-as-input 
hypothesis and indicated that child worry is 
similar to adult worry. Children provided a 
number of reasons for why they stopped or 
continued a bout of worrying 
Muris et al 
(1998) 
To study the content, 
characteristics and origins of 
children’s main worries. 
Mixed: Quant – 
Questionnaire; Qual – 
Structured interview 
Content 
Analysis 
n=193; School children; 89 
girls, 104 boys; Age range 8-
13; Mean age – 10.8 
Provided some evidence for the idea that 
worrying was motivated by prior aversive or 
threatening experience. Identified that worry is 
common in children. Worry control strategies 
were identified along with perceived positive 
aspects of worry 
Szabo & 
Lovibond 
(2004) 
To investigate whether 
children’s worry is similar in 
cognitive content to worry in 
an adult population. 
Qual – Structured 
interview 
Content 
Analysis 
n=89; 38 clinic referred 
anxious children, 51 non-
referred school children; 50 
girls, 39 boys; Age range 8-
13 
Problem-solving and Negative Anticipation 
most common forms of worry, indicating that 
child and adult worrying is similar in 
presentation; no significant differences found 
between the two groups 
Szabo & 
Lovibond 
(2002) 
To document the extent of 
negative outcome anticipation, 
problem-solving and other 
types of cognition involved in 
self-reported worry 
Qual – Diary 
completion 
Content 
Analysis 
n=57; 1
st
 year psychology 
students, 67% female, 33% 
male; Mean age 20.65; 
Divided into analogue GAD, 
moderate worriers and low 
worriers, based on GAD 
questionnaire scores 
No difference between chronic and low worriers 
in the number of worries coded as Negative 
Anticipation and Problem-solving 
Roth & 
Eng (2002) 
To investigate the etiological 
beliefs self-defined worriers 
report about worry 
Mixed: Quant – 
Questionnaire; Qual - 
Questionnaire 
Content 
Analysis 
n=117; University students; 
82.1% female, 17.9% male; 
Mean age 20.62 
Provides some indication of the types of reasons 
worriers have for worrying: Personality Factors 
(65.67%), Family Influences (35.82%), Life 
Events (14.93%), Genetics (4.48%), 
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Social/Interpersonal (1.49%) 
Molina et 
al (1998) 
To determine the temporal, 
affective and cognitive 
features of worry amongst 
participants meeting 
diagnostic criteria for GAD 
and dysphoria, or neither 
Qual – Laboratory 
stream of 
consciousness 
Content 
Analysis 
n=40; Female university 
students; 3 groups based on 
GAD & depression 
questionnaires – ‘chronic 
worry without excessive 
depression’, ‘high 
depression without worry’, 
‘absence of worry and 
depression’; No age data 
given 
A number of characteristics of worry episodes 
provided, relating to Temporal Orientation, 
Affect, Reference to Environment and Topic 
Shifts 
Hoyer et al 
(2001) 
To examine the clinical 
phenomenology of worry in 
participants diagnosed with 
GAD, Social Phobia, or 
neither. 
Mixed: Quant – 
Structured interview, 
closed questions; 
Qual – Structured 
Interview, open 
questions 
Content 
Analysis 
n=88; 44.4% GAD patients, 
40.9% Social phobia 
patients, 43.8% non-clinical 
controls; Mean ages 43.4, 
47.8 & 44.8 respectively; All 
female 
No specificity of content found between the 
groups. Control strategies used more by GAD 
participants.  Open questions identified different 
strategies for controlling worry: Alcohol/Drugs, 
Exaggerating, Problem-solving and Relaxing 
Davey et al 
(1996) 
To explore the range of 
consequences that individuals 
perceive worry to have and 
how these consequences relate 
to measures of 
psychopathology. 
Mixed: Qual – 
Questionnaire, open 
question; Quant – 
Factor analysis of 
questionnaire results 
Content 
Analysis 
n=128; University students; 
52 male, 76 female; Age 
range 18-59 
Identified a range of perceived consequences of 
worry. Ratings of positive beliefs showed a 
positive correlation with depression, 
catastrophic worrying and negative thoughts 
Cartwright
-Hatton & 
Wells 
(1997) 
To develop a measure of 
dimensions of meta-cognition 
and to explore the relationship 
between meta-cognition, 
worry and intrusions 
Mixed: Qual – 
Questionnaire, open 
questions; Quant – 
Factor analysis of 
questionnaire results 
Thematic 
Analysis 
n=25; University students; 
14 male, 11 female; No age 
data given 
Identified different dimensions of meta-
cognitions, which enabled the development of a 
meta-cognition questionnaire 
Hinton & 
Earnest 
(2010) 
To examine health as it is 
situated within the socio-
cultural context of Papa New 
Qual – Focus groups 
and interviews 
Qualitative 
Interpretative 
n=84; Papa New Guinean 
community sample; 70 
female, 14 male; Age range: 
Female – 18-24 (33), 25-44 
Identified a number of aspects that participants 
felt contributed to worry, such as lack of control 
and parental worry. Participants also expressed 
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Guinean women’s lives (27), >44 (10); Male – 
“young men and adult men” 
belief that worry impacted on physical health. 
Svensson 
& Fridlund 
(2008) 
To describe incidents in which 
ambulance nurses experience 
worry in their professional life 
and the actions they take to 
prevent and cope with it 
Qual – Semi-
structured interviews 
Critical 
Incident 
Technique 
n=25; Swedish ambulance 
nurses; 12 female, 13 male; 
No age data given 
Identified a number of themes related to worry, 
including perceptions about the value of worry 
and factors that seem to influence the extent of 
worry, such as experience, knowledge and 
support from others 
Boutain 
(2001) 
To explore how a sample of 
rural Louisiana residents 
constructed accounts about 
worry and stress in 
relationship to their high blood 
pressure 
Qual – Semi-
structured interviews 
Discourse 
Analysis 
n=30; African-American 
community sample; 15 
female, 15 male; Mean age: 
Male – 54.7; Female – 54.6 
Provided an insight into the relation between 
physical health and worrying. Participants 
described significant worries about their health, 
their family and their community 
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Critique of Selected Studies 
Key Strengths 
Most of the selected studies had sample sizes that were much larger than might typically be 
found in qualitative studies, such as the studies conducted by Davey, Tallis and Capuzzo 
(1996) and Roth and Eng (2002) which recruited 128 and 117 participants respectively. 
Davey et al (1996) administered a questionnaire asking about the perceived consequences of 
worry, the results of which were then analysed, indicating an apparent link between beliefs 
about worry and levels of psychological functioning. Roth and Eng (2002), as part of a larger 
questionnaire study, asked participants what they believed the cause of their worry to be. A 
particular strength of the latter study was the use of participants’ own words to substantiate 
the codes that were reported. 
 
Three studies identified and sought to address the lack of research into childhood experiences 
of worry. Turner and Wilson (2010) recruited adolescents aged between 11 and 13 from 
secondary schools. Turner and Wilson (2010) attempted to replicate previous studies 
conducted with adults, testing the mood-as-input hypothesis of worry using an experimental 
design. In addition, Turner and Wilson (2010) also extended the study by obtaining 
qualitative descriptions of key aspects of the experiment conditions. Muris et al (1998) 
administered worry and mood questionnaires to a large sample of 193 children, aged between 
8 and 13. This study was also strengthened by participants being interviewed about the 
content, characteristics and origins of their main worries. The final study targeting the lack of 
research into children’s worry was conducted by Szabo and Lovibond (2004). This study 
aimed to investigate whether worry reported by children would exhibit the same problem-
solving characteristics as evidenced in adult worry. Eighty-nine children were involved in the 
study. The children were aged 8 to 13. Thirty-eight were recruited from mental health clinics 
23 
 
who had been referred with symptoms of anxiety. The remaining fifty-one children were 
recruited from local schools, with no reported mental health difficulties. Rather than relying 
on the use of questionnaires, the researchers opted to interview participants, which had the 
potential to produce more detailed responses. 
 
Two other studies chose to utilise interviews instead of limiting their findings to statistical 
analyses of questionnaire-based data. Hoyer, Becker and Roth (2001) identified that research 
into worry had typically tended to involve undergraduate students, with clinical samples 
rarely used. Hoyer, Becker and Roth (2001) recruited participants from a mental health 
service in order to investigate the experience of worry. An additional strength of this study 
was that they recruited participants with a diagnosis of GAD and participants diagnosed with 
social phobia who acted as clinical controls. Cartwright-Hatton and Wells (1997) aimed to 
develop a measure of dimensions of meta-cognition. While questionnaires may have been 
sufficient for this purpose, they elected to use data obtained through semi-structured 
interviews with 25 undergraduate students, along with transcripts of therapy with anxious 
patients. 
 
Two of the selected studies employed procedures that enabled ‘active’ worry data to be 
captured, which had the potential to identify characteristics of worry that might have been 
missing from studies using historic accounts of worry episodes. Szabo and Lovibond (2002) 
recruited 57 undergraduate students and asked them to keep a daily diary of naturally 
occurring worry episodes in order to identify the cognitive content present in the worries 
recorded. Molina, Borkovec, Peasley and Person (1998) aimed to investigate the 
phenomenology of worry using ‘live’ worries. Forty undergraduate students were instructed 
to verbalise their ‘streams of consciousness’ during neutral and worry periods. 
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Three studies stood apart from the others in terms of their use of more comprehensive 
qualitative methodologies. Hinton and Earnest (2010) recruited 84 participants from a Papua 
New Guinean community, aiming to explore the links between physical and psychosocial 
health. The study used a range of data collection methods, including interviews and focus 
groups, the results of which were analysed leading to the identification of a number of worry 
and health related themes. Svensson and Fridlund (2008) focused upon the experience of 
worry for ambulance nurses during emergency situations. Semi-structured interviews with 25 
ambulance nurses were conducted and analysed, from which emerged a range of worry-
related themes. Boutain (2001) sought to explore, with a sample of 30 rural Louisana 
community members, the relationships that were perceived to exist between their experiences 
of worry, stress and high blood pressure. Participants engaged in in-depth semi-structured 
interviews, the transcripts of which were subject to discourse analysis techniques. 
 
In summary, the key strengths from the selected studies related to the size of the samples, the 
populations that were investigated, the data collection methods or the types of methodologies 
utilised. 
 
Key Limitations 
Eight of the studies employed an analysis procedure which involved coding the qualitative 
data according to categories that were either pre-defined (Molina et al, 1998; Roth & Eng, 
2002; Szabo & Lovibond, 2002; Szabo & Lovibond, 2004) or limited to the specific 
questions that were asked in the data collection process (Davey et al, 1996; Hoyer et al, 2001; 
Muris et al, 1998; Turner & Wilson, 2010). As a result, this restricted the range of findings 
that was generated, especially in the case of Turner and Wilson (2010), where the interview 
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questions and responses were closely connected to the instructions (‘worry as much as 
possible or as long as you feel like it’) and the conditions that were manipulated (induction of 
negative and positive mood) in the experimental section of the study. There was a lack of 
detail provided about how the pre-defined categories were developed, and how the 
researchers’ standpoints may have influenced this development along with the subsequent 
coding of data. 
 
Three of the selected studies were directly linked to specific models of worry: the mood as 
input hypothesis (Davey et al, 1996; Turner & Wilson, 2010) and the meta-cognitive model 
(Cartwright-Hatton & Wells, 1997). None of these studies made reference to how the 
findings could have been biased by the authors’ positions and preconceptions about what they 
might discover. Furthermore, the study by Cartwright-Hatton and Wells (1997) provided no 
information about how participants were recruited, how interview questions were devised or 
what the analysis of participant responses actually involved. 
 
Although three studies (Boutain, 2001; Hinton & Earnest, 2010; Svensson & Fridlund, 2008) 
utilised more comprehensive qualitative methodologies, there was a lack of transparency and 
clarity around how participants were recruited and how interview questions were developed. 
Furthermore, there was limited discussion in the reports concerning ethical considerations, 
bias and researcher standpoints.  
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Synthesis of Findings 
The results from all of the studies were examined in detail and the key findings related to the 
experience of worry were extracted. These were reviewed and compared across studies in an 
attempt to find commonalities and structure amongst the findings. This resulted in the 
identification of the following themes: 
 
1. Control over worry. This theme consisted of a range of strategies and 
circumstances which affected whether and how much individuals had control over worrying. 
Of the seven studies that identified this theme, four (Hoyer et al, 2001; Muris et al, 1998; 
Szabo & Lovibond, 2004; Turner & Wilson, 2010) specifically asked participants how they 
controlled worry. In one study (Cartwright-Hatton & Wells, 1997), “the need to control 
thoughts” and “controllability of thoughts” were two key domains that appeared to emerge 
during analysis. However, the researchers did not detail any of the participant responses that 
contributed to these domains. In another study (Svensson & Fridlund, 2008), the theme of 
controllability also emerged from the analysis. Participants’ own words were used to 
substantiate and clarify the theme of controllability. 
 
A common dimension associated with the theme of control involved the focus of  worry 
being framed as a ‘problem’, with control arising from some change in the nature of the 
problem or how it was addressed. This included the problem being minimised (“reality 
check” (Turner & Wilson, 2010)), solved (“I decided to play with Joshua” (Szabo & 
Lovibond, 2004)) or the problem going away (“I worried until we got there and it was 
alright” (Szabo & Lovibond, 2004)). In a similar vein, another strategy involved the salience 
of the worry focus being reduced through mental distraction(“I thought about nice things, like 
the presents I got for Christmas” (Szabo & Lovibond, 2004); “think about pleasant things” 
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(Muris et al, 1998)) or physical distraction (“Engage in activity” (Muris et al, 1998); 
“relaxing” and “alcohol/drugs” (Hoyer et al, 2001)).  
 
There was considerable focus in one study (Turner & Wilson, 2010) on the role of emotions 
in guiding the worrying process. This either consisted of taking control of worry because of 
how it made the person feel: 
 
“In the end I just thought it would be better to stop as it would stop me going further 
up the scale because my sadness had nearly reached the half-way mark, and my 
anxiety was nearly (points to the high end of the scale” (Turner & Wilson, 2010) 
 
Or, it related to a change in the person’s mood which seemed to allow them to stop the 
worrying process: 
 
“When I started to get to the bottom of it I started to feel happy. And feeling, I’ve 
solved this problem” (Turner & Wilson, 2010) 
 
Finally, the existence of support and reassurance from others was frequently identified as a 
factor associated with whether individuals were able to gain control over their worry. This 
involved talking to significant others generally, or specifically about their worry (Muris et al, 
1998), with comments made such as “I talked to my mum about it and she said it will be 
alright” (Szabo & Lovibond, 2004) and “you talk about it with a colleague you have 
confidence in and feel secure with” (Svensson & Fridlund, 2008). 
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2. Value assessment of worry. This theme related to how worry was perceived, in 
terms of its features or consequences. This theme appeared to consist of a positive and 
negative dimension, generated from questions which emphasised this dichotomy (“Children 
were asked whether their worry had any positive features” (Muris et al, 1998); “Respondents 
were then asked to list separately and in their own words as many ways as they could think of 
that worry either made things worse or better” (Davey et al, 1996); “Subjects were questioned 
about...in particular their reasons for engaging in this type of cognitive activity and the 
problems associated with it” (Cartwright-Hatton & Wells, 1997)) and also from the analyses 
of responses in interviews that did not appear to involve questions structured in this manner 
(Boutain, 2001; Hinton & Earnest, 2010; Svensson & Fridlund, 2008). 
 
Positive assessments predominantly involved worry helping individuals to cope with 
potential problems (“Worry as a coping mechanism” (Cartwright-Hatton & Wells, 1997); 
“[Worry] allowed them to cope with a difficult, future event…in a more effective way” 
(Muris et al, 1998)). Specific ways in which worry appeared to facilitate coping included 
being able to identify problems (“Worry as a mechanism for detecting future catastrophe” 
(Cartwright-Hatton & Wells, 1997); “You kind of have to prepare yourself… think about 
different scenarios, the kind of equipment you have, the kind of measures you might have to 
take” (Svensson & Fridlund, 2008)) and solve them (“Worry as a method of problem-
solving” (Cartwright-Hatton & Wells, 1997); “Worrying gives me the opportunity to analyze 
situations and work out the pros and cons” (Davey et al, 1996); “I thought I should carry on 
because I might be able to think about what I can do to solve it” (Turner & Wilson, 2010)) 
and also create the conditions under which the problem-solving process could function 
effectively (“A certain amount of stress and worry is good so to speak, because it makes you 
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more alert” (Svensson & Fridlund, 2008); “Worrying acts as a stimulant”; “Worrying 
clarifies thoughts and concentration” (Davey et al, 1996). 
 
The principal reasons for worrying being viewed negatively related to the impact that it was 
perceived to have on mental and physical health. Mentally, worry was felt to lead to negative 
emotions and to undermine individuals’ ability to function effectively (“I cannot say that I go 
around worrying, because if I did, I don’t think I could cope with this job” (Svensson & 
Fridlund, 2008); “Worrying increases my anxiety and so decreases my performance”; 
“Worrying makes me depressed and therefore makes it harder to concentrate and get on with 
things” (Davey et al, 1996). With regard to physical health, participants described a number 
of ways in which worrying might be unpleasant (“Worrying weakens me by affecting my 
energy levels” (Davey et al, 1996), harmful (“So he found out it wasn’t the medicine [not 
working] that was keeping my blood pressure high. It was me worrying about myself having 
high blood pressure” (Boutain, 2001)) or even fatal (“If you worry too much, it will kill you” 
(Hinton & Earnest, 2010)). 
 
Additional negative consequences that were felt to exist included the idea that worrying, with 
the associated problems this produced, led to further worrying: “Mr George said that his 
worry about high blood pressure, and his inability to work because of it, made him worry 
about his family’s stability” (Boutain, 2001). It was also suggested that worrying could be 
transferred directly from one generation to another (“If the mother is worried, the child will 
also have this worry…the child will be born with worry” (Hinton & Earnest, 2010)). Both 
scenarios would seem to represent something of a vicious cycle of worry contamination, 
wherein the already negatively-appraised worry leads to more worry in the self or others, 
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with potentially similar negative attributes, leading to more worry in the self or others, and so 
on. 
 
3. Perceived causes of worry. In the study conducted by Roth and Eng (2002), 
participants were asked to describe their beliefs about why they were worriers. The responses 
included genetics (“Genetics - my mum is a worrier”), family influences (“Factors pretty 
much include my mom. She was always a worrier when I was growing up and still is”), 
personality (“I have always been high-strung and anxious for as long as I can remember”) 
and life events (“I was really not a worrier until this semester of school”). In both Hinton and 
Earnest (2010) and Svensson and Fridlund (2008), control over events emerged as a factor 
which helped individuals explain why they worried: 
 
“When the young women in this study struggled to think through or cope with their 
frustration and lack of control over life circumstances, they expressed a vulnerability 
to worry” (Hinton & Earnest, 2010) 
 
“[Worrying] that you cannot control the situation…you want to be in control when 
you are at the scene of an accident or in someone’s home” (Svensson & Fridlund, 
2008) 
 
Additional causes of worry suggested by participants in the study conducted by Svensson  
and Fridlund (2008) also enabled a deeper understanding of what may affect control over 
events. These related to feelings of inadequacy (“The worry comes from not being able to 
help the patient in a satisfactory way”), lack of trust in others (“If I lack trust in my colleague 
I worry about both him/her and myself, that we will not manage it”) and having experience or 
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knowledge, which seemed to have an effect in both directions (“The longer you have worked 
and the more you have experienced, the calmer you are, because you know you can manage”; 
“The more you have learned through the years, the more you can do, and the more 
responsibility you take in the ambulance, the more reason you have to worry”). 
 
4. Cognitive features of worry. The final theme involved the elucidation of specific 
features that appeared to constitute the cognitive nature of worry. In the three studies that 
reported these specific findings (Szabo & Lovibond, 2002; Szabo & Lovibond, 2004; Molina 
et al, 1998), the approach taken was to analyse and code the content of participants’ worry, 
using predefined cognitive categories. In studies by Szabo and Lovibond (2002 & 2004), the 
categories used were: ‘Negative Outcome Anticipation’ – a focus upon negative events that 
may occur (“A tornado may come and get my house and we will just go round and round in 
the air” (Szabo & Lovibond, 2004), “This party will be so awful” (Szabo & Lovibond, 
2002)); Problem-Solving – cognitive processing of how negative events could be managed 
(“If I ran away he would probably chase me, and then my friends would laugh at me” (Szabo 
& Lovibond, 2004), “I should call him up to explain” (Szabo & Lovibond, 2002)); Solution 
Selection – making a decision how to proceed after weighing up the options (“I’ll start with 
writing a letter today” (Szabo & Lovibond, 2002), “I’ll just tell my parents the truth” (Szabo 
& Lovibond, 2004)); Palliative – thoughts aimed to make the self feel better (“Don’t worry, 
just go to sleep” (Szabo & Lovibond, 2004), “It’ll be ok. Stop worrying. Imagining nice 
things” (Szabo & Lovibond, 2002)); Self-blame – thinking of oneself in a self-critical way (“I 
wish I had some pride” (Szabo & Lovibond, 2002)); Rumination – unproductive processing 
of negative thoughts or images (“Life is just not fair” (Szabo & Lovibond, 2002)); 
Fantasizing Solutions – thinking about unrealistic options to deal with problems (“Imagined 
punching him” (Szabo & Lovibond, 2002)). 
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In the other study (Molina et al, 1998), the categories used seemed to involve lower level 
descriptions of the structure of worry. These included whether the worry content was 
orientated towards the past, present or future; the level of positive or negative affect that was 
present; how much reference was made to the person’s environment; and how much the 
worry content shifted around from one topic to another. This analysis indicated that worry 
involved less present-orientation, lower positive affect (and higher negative affect), less 
reference to the environment and less shifting of topics. Unfortunately, no participant 
responses were given to substantiate these findings. 
 
Discussion 
The aim of this literature review was to review qualitative research that has been conducted 
into the topic of worry, an experience that has a significant impact on mental health and 
quality of life. The twelve studies identified by the literature search and filtering process 
provide a limited amount of qualitative information, related to a number of key recurring 
themes. These can be summarised as follows: a) a need for control over worry, b) a value 
assessment of worry, c) the perceived causes of worry, and d) the cognitive features of worry.  
 
The theme of control has appeared in the worry literature for a significant period of time and 
is central to the meta-cognitive theory of worry (Wells, 1995). Here beliefs about the 
uncontrollability of worry are felt to generate further distress, resulting in problematic levels 
of worry developing. Similarly, the idea of holding positive and negative attitudes in general 
about worry has long been discussed in articles related to worry and is again strongly linked 
to the meta-cognitive theory. ‘The perceived causes of worry’ incorporated a number of 
themes and processes, such as a need for knowledge, experience and control, which has 
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similarities with the intolerance of uncertainty theory (Koerner & Dugas, 2006). As described 
earlier, this theory hypothesises that individuals are driven to worry to excessive levels due to 
beliefs that worry is able to provide high levels of control and certainty. Finally, the cognitive 
features of worry involved descriptions about the cognitive structure of worry. Such 
descriptions have frequently been investigated and reported in past studies, and have often 
served as a way to identify and operationalise the apparent components of the worry process. 
 
However, it is important to note that a number of the reviewed studies specifically asked 
participants about control, value judgements, causes and cognitive elements of worry (Davey 
et al, 1996; Hoyer et al, 2001; Molina et al, 1998; Muris et al, 1998; Roth & Eng, 2002; 
Szabo & Lovibond, 2002; Szabo & Lovibond, 2004; Turner & Wilson, 2010). This highlights 
a specific concern with a number of the identified studies that undermined the overall value 
of the combined qualitative findings. While many of the studies used open questions during 
interviews, these questions were often linked directly to theories that the researchers wished 
to validate or experiments and questionnaires that had been administered with participants as 
part of the same study (Cartwright-Hatton & Wells, 1997; Davey et al, 1996; Molina et al, 
1998; Turner & Wilson, 2010). This would potentially allow participants’ responses to be 
influenced by the theories, assumptions, experiments or questionnaires in question, and might 
also bias the consequent analysis of the data. No reference was made by the researchers in 
these studies as to how their standpoints and assumptions might have potentially affected the 
research process (or how this was or could have been minimised). Furthermore, most of these 
studies used content analysis to summarise the type and number of responses that participants 
gave, with many using predefined categories to collate the results (Molina et al, 1998; Roth & 
Eng, 2002; Szabo & Lovibond, 2002; Szabo & Lovibond, 2004). This again may have 
significantly biased the analysis, with no explanation given for the choice of the categories. It 
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is unlikely that such an approach would produce qualitative results of any particular depth or 
richness which would extend much beyond the researchers’ assumptions about possible 
findings. This is in spite of the relevant studies suggesting in their aims and discussions that 
qualitative data was sought and obtained. 
 
Three of the selected studies (Boutain, 2001; Hinton & Earnest, 2010; Svensson & Fridlund, 
2008) utilised a more rigorous qualitative methodology. These studies did not appear to have 
been conducted in order to develop or validate a particular theory or approach. In these 
studies, the aims and methodologies suggested that the research was explorative, with 
interviews conducted to understand participants’ perspectives. Again, only one of the studies 
made tentative reference to the possibility of researcher bias (Hinton & Earnest, 2010), while 
the others did not discuss this issue at all (Boutain, 2001; Svensson & Fridlund, 2008). The 
analysis techniques used by the researchers seemed to involve a considerable level of 
immersion in the data, resulting in themes that were more meaningful and insightful than 
those seen in the studies that utilised a content analysis approach. However, in spite of a 
moderate increase in the quality of these studies, the areas of investigation in these studies 
were not as specifically focused on the experience of worry. Instead, their primary targets 
were challenges faced by particular groups, from which the presence of worry was identified 
and explored (in terms of how worry related to the original challenges faced by these groups). 
 
Based upon the current review, there has not been a single qualitative study specifically 
investigating the experience of worry that meets even the most relaxed standards of 
qualitative research. Given the significant interest in the area over the last three decades along 
with the level of distress and clinical challenges that worry can generate, this is a surprising 
outcome. One possible explanation is that worry has been strongly linked with the field of 
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cognitive behavioural therapy, which tends to posit discrete and measurable variables, in the 
form of accessible thoughts and beliefs, emotions and physical states (Clark & Beck, 2010; 
Leahy, Holland & McGuinn, 2012; Wells, 1997). Conceptualised in this way, it is perhaps 
more likely that the topic would attract more quantitative than qualitative research.  
 
Despite this, it is not necessarily the case that qualitative data has been seen as unimportant or 
irrelevant. As discussed in this review, a number of studies have sought to obtain such data. It 
is possibly more that the route to obtaining qualitative data has been lacking in quality and 
transparency. A number of quantitative studies have suggested that they were based upon 
subjective experiences, while on further reading, these tended to take the form of unpublished 
clinical (i.e. Brown, O’Leary & Barlow, 1993; Borkovec & Roemer, 1995; Koerner & Dugas, 
2006; Wells, 2005) or research interviews (i.e. Borkovec, 1994). Had these interviews been 
conducted as part of a qualitative study, with the design, methodology, analysis and findings 
available for scrutiny and replication, the body of qualitative research around worry would 
have been significantly richer. 
 
In terms of potential limitations associated with this qualitative literature review of worry, the 
first aspect to highlight relates to the different types of studies identified. A large number of 
the identified studies were questionable in terms of being qualitative in design. The majority 
of reviewed studies included a key quantitative component, while the minority were more 
explicitly qualitative (Boutain, 2001; Hinton & Earnest, 2010; Svensson & Fridlund, 2008). 
Integrating the findings from these disparate approaches proved a challenge. This may have 
led to the overall synthesis of results being negatively diluted, especially given the apparently 
poor quality of many of the studies. It may have been an option to separate out the findings 
between the different types and levels of quality. However there did appear to be a substantial 
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degree of crossover in the findings, so any separation may have diluted the resulting 
synthesis. 
 
Another limitation of the current review was the age range of participants used within the 
selected studies. Three of the studies involved children. One concern is that the children may 
have been more susceptible to being influenced by the researchers’ standpoints, especially if 
the children were uncertain about or unskilled at thinking reflectively about a relatively 
complex psychological phenomenon. In none of the studies that utilised children was there 
any reference to such problems or how they might have been mitigated. Nonetheless, it is 
reassuring that in two of the studies (Szabo & Lovibond, 2004; Turner & Wilson, 2010), the 
findings were similar to those reported in the adult studies which were being replicated. 
 
Finally, there is potentially a general issue with investigating the phenomenon of worry. In all 
of the studies, participants reported on their level or experience of worry. Alternatively, 
worry was induced by a variety of means, such as reading emotionally-relevant statements 
(York, Borkovec, Vasey & Stern, 1987; Andrews & Borkovec, 1988) or asking participants 
to worry “in their usual fashion” (Borkovec & Inz, 1990, p155). Yet it is not clear that what 
the different participants were reporting or the phenomenon that was being induced was 
necessarily the same thing. This then has serious consequences for the conclusions that are 
drawn about the nature of worry, its mechanism and its relationship with mental health. 
 
Key Implications for Future Research 
This review indicates that there is a need for future research into the experience of worry 
using a comprehensive qualitative methodology. Such research, conducted in a clear and 
transparent manner, would enable rich and detailed narratives to be obtained and analysed. 
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This would hopefully lead to a deeper appreciation of the phenomenon of worry and allow an 
enhanced and nuanced understanding of why worry can develop to problematic levels. This 
could provide valuable guidance and inform interventions for treating individuals who 
present in clinical settings with these levels of worry. 
 
Conclusion 
This review indicates that although there have been a limited number of qualitative studies 
conducted into the experience of worry, there are significant limitations to these studies. 
These concern the methodologies used, the quality of the analyses and the lack of discussion 
around researcher bias.  It appears there is a need for further qualitative research into the 
topic of worry, in order to gain subjective accounts from individuals around what they 
understand by the term worry and how this is experienced. Qualitative studies utilising 
rigorous and transparent methodologies enable rich data to be collected and the maximum 
amount of meaning to be extracted from this data. This would hopefully permit the 
identification of dominant themes that have been allowed to emerge through a process where 
quality, ethical standards and the minimisation of bias are key priorities. Such information 
could enhance or challenge existing theories of worry, which may provide a valuable insight 
into why worry can become problematic for individuals and how they could be supported 
clinically. 
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Abstract 
Worry is associated with a range of common mental health difficulties and has become a 
prominent focus of psychological research over the last three decades. Most of this research 
has been quantitative and has led to the development of a number of theories of how worry is 
maintained. The present study uses a qualitative design, following the main principles of 
Constructivist Grounded Theory. Twelve individuals who reported excessive levels of worry 
were recruited from two mental health services (a primary care, student health centre and a 
secondary care recovery team). Interviews were conducted with the participants, in which 
they described various aspects of their experience of worry. Interview transcripts were coded 
and analysed, leading to the development of a theory of worry which acted as an 
interpretation of the participants’ subjective experience of worry. Key theoretical categories 
in relation to the development and maintenance of participants’ worry, included: the role of 
distressing life events; the sense that the difficulties faced were not fully understood or 
acknowledged; and the dilemma over whether worry is a beneficial or malign presence in 
their lives. Findings of the study are discussed, along with the clinical implications, 
methodological limitations and suggestions for future areas of research. 
 
Keywords 
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Qualitative 
Grounded theory 
Clinical sample 
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Introduction 
In the last thirty years, worry has become a prominent area of interest in terms of both 
psychological research and clinical practice. One of first concerted attempts at understanding 
the phenomenon of worry was led by Tom Borkovec, leading to a seminal paper on the 
subject (Borkovec, Robinson, Pruzinsky & DePree, 1983). Prior to this point, it appears that 
worry was considered to be an inevitable but inconsequential corollary of anxiety (Davey & 
Tallis, 1994; Purdon & Harrington, 2006). However, with the inclusion of worry as a primary 
diagnostic criteria for Generalised Anxiety Disorder in DSM III-R (American Psychiatric 
Association, 1987), worry seems to have become cemented as a cognitive ‘symptom’ of 
mental disorder, connected to anxiety but quantifiable and observable in its own right. 
Research which has explored worry has been predominantly quantitative. Studies have tended 
to operationalise worry using questionnaires and experiments (Borkovec et al, 1983; York, 
Borkovec, Vasey & Stern, 1987; Davey & Levy, 1998; Dugas, Letarte, Rheame, Freeston 
&Ladouceur, 1995; Meyer, Miller, Metzger & Borkovec, 1990; Molina & Borkovec, 1994; 
Tallis, Davey & Capuzzo, 1994; Tallis, Eysenck & Mathews, 1991; Tallis, Eysenck & 
Mathews, 1992; Wells, 1994) to measure and observe the characteristics and consequences of 
a discrete behaviour or experience (i.e. worry) that exists in reality, which individuals report 
to a greater or lesser degree. Many of these studies have indicated that worry exists on a 
continuum, in terms of frequency, intensity and the impact it can have on individuals’ lives. 
A range of models and theories have been produced which attempt to explain how and why 
worry develops and can become problematic. They include the cognitive avoidance model 
(Borkovec, 1994), the metacognitive model (Wells, 1995), the intolerance of uncertainty 
theory (Dugas, Freeston & Ladouceur, 1997), the mood-as-input hypothesis (Startup & 
Davey, 2001) and the contrast avoidance model (Newman & Llera, 2011). 
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Despite an abundance of quantitative research into worry, qualitative research into the topic 
appears to be lacking. There are a limited number of studies which have purported to 
undertake qualitative research (Boutain, 2001; Cartwright-Hatton & Wells, 1997; Davey, 
Tallis & Capuzzo, 1996; Hinton & Earnest, 2010; Hoyer, Becker & Roth, 2001; Molina, 
Borkovec, Peasley & Person, 1998; Muris, Meesters, Merckelbach, Sermon & Zwakhalen, 
1998; Roth & Eng, 2002; Svensson & Fridlund, 2008; Szabo & Lovibond, 2002; Szabo & 
Lovibond, 2004; Turner & Wilson, 2010). However, reviewing these studies reveals 
significant weaknesses in the methodology and analysis of participant responses. The 
majority of the studies (Davey et al, 1996; Hoyer et al, 2001; Molina et al, 1998; Muris et al, 
1998; Roth & Eng, 2002; Szabo & Lovibond, 2002; Szabo & Lovibond, 2004; Turner & 
Wilson, 2010) were linked to pre-existing theories of worry. As a result, the influence of the 
researchers’ positions on the interview questions which were utilised in the studies and the 
themes that were identified represented an unresolved concern. This kind of approach would 
undermine the reliability of a study. In addition, the breadth and richness of the results would 
potentially be compromised due to a restricted extraction of meaning from participant 
narratives. 
 
A number of quantitative studies have argued that their research is partially based upon 
qualitative information linked to “anecdotal accounts from patients” (p202, Koerner & 
Dugas, 2006), “reports of our former GAD clients” (Borkovec & Roemer, 1995, p26), “the 
author’s clinical experience with worriers and GAD patients” (Freeston, Rheaume, Letarte, 
Dugas & Ladouceur, 1994, p793). However, this potentially valuable information is not 
described in any detail. The process involved in relation to the procurement and analysis of 
the data is not expanded upon. It is not clear why the findings were not presented or 
replicated as part of a published qualitative study. This kind of study would have enabled 
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some level of scrutiny to take place. It may be that the apparent predominance in the field of 
worry of a positivist standpoint and quantitative research has resulted in rigorous and 
transparent qualitative research being considered surplus to requirements. Such an approach 
may be linked to a view of qualitative research as being useful only in so far as it enables the 
development of quantitative instruments, effectively positioning qualitative research in the 
role of a “junior partner” (Murphy, Dingwall, Greatbatch, Parker & Watson, 1998, p59). 
 
However, the relative paucity of qualitative research into worry may mean that crucial 
information has been missed or overlooked. It has been argued that “it is only in the context 
of non-positivistic interviewing…that ‘intersubjective depth’ and ‘deep-mutual 
understanding’ can be achieved” (Miller & Glassner, 1997, p100). It is this depth and 
richness of data that quantitative research is unlikely to be able to obtain. This is not simply 
in terms of how questions are asked and what specific questions are asked, although this is 
certainly a vitally important and skilful part of the process (Holstein & Gubrium, (1997), but 
how the resulting responses are analysed. Unless the researcher(s) become immersed in the 
data and allow the participants’ voices to be heard; unless they enable ‘authentic insights’ 
(Silverman, 1993) to emerge organically with potential bias identified, minimised and taken 
into consideration, then the resulting findings are likely to be compromised. 
 
The fact that worry is considered to be a common feature not just of GAD, but also of many 
clinical presentations of anxiety (Brown, Antony & Barlow, 1992; Davey et al, 1996; Dugas 
et al, 1997) suggests that it is important to understand the experience of worry as 
comprehensively as possible. Current theories of worry have directly and indirectly informed 
the production of intervention guidelines for treating worry in clinical and non-clinical 
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contexts (i.e. Wells, 1997; Leahy, 2006; Saulsman, Nathan, Lim & Correia, 2005). It is a 
concern that these theories of worry and intervention guidelines for the treatment of worry are 
based upon a research base that has overlooked qualitative methods (and privileged 
quantitative methods). The current study represents an initial attempt to use a qualitative 
methodology to explore the experience of worry. 
 
Although many studies indicate that the phenomenon of worry may exist on a continuum, it 
has been suggested that an “implicit assumption” (Ruscio, 2002, p378) is present in much of 
the worry literature that there are only two discrete forms of worry: ‘normal’ and 
‘problematic’ worry. Furthermore, it is felt that ‘problematic’ worry is seen as an exclusive 
experience of those diagnosed with GAD, with the majority of studies then focused on that 
particular population (Ruscio, 2002; Ruscio & Borkovec, 2004). With these factors in mind, 
this study is based upon the premise that worry occurs on a continuum. In order to understand 
how and why worry can escalate to levels that are experienced as problematic, it was 
necessary to identify the “best examples” (Bryant & Charmaz, 2007, p234); people who 
could provide the richest narratives, who were felt to be those for whom worry is frequent, 
intense and causes considerable difficulties. It was anticipated that such individuals were 
most likely to be found in a clinical sample, and due to the transdiagnostic nature of worry, 
would not be limited to those with a diagnosis of GAD. As such, participants were recruited 
from primary and secondary care mental health services who reported significant levels of 
worry (rather than based upon the diagnosis they might have received). 
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In order to remain open to the range of meanings that the term worry may have for 
individuals, for the purposes of the current study, worry is loosely defined as a focus on 
potential future threat and on the resources available to cope with that threat (Barlow, 2002). 
The aims of the study are:  
 To explore how worry is perceived, characterised and understood in a group of 
individuals who report worry as being a significant aspect of their lives 
 To develop a theory of worry based on this exploration which may provide an insight into 
why worry can become problematic 
 
Methodology 
Rationale for Choice of Methodology 
The aim of the current study was to develop a theory of worry, directly and explicitly shaped 
by the accounts of individuals who experience worry excessively. Grounded theory involves 
analysis techniques that stay close to the data and a theory generation process that is 
grounded in the experiences being explored (Charmaz, 2006a). As such this approach was 
considered to be the most appropriate qualitative methodology to use. Grounded theory was 
also chosen over other qualitative methodologies such as Interpretative Phenomenological 
Analysis (IPA), due to its emphasis on explaining processes and behaviour (Starks & 
Trinidad, 2007), both of which appear to represent key aspects of worry. Although grounded 
theory has its roots in sociology, it is argued that the approach can be used to study the 
development and maintenance of individual processes. A grounded theory approach also 
seeks to understand the “multiple layers of meanings of their actions” (p90, Charmaz, 2006b), 
which is a specific objective of this study. Social constructivist grounded theory, as 
developed by Charmaz (2000; 2006a), was favoured over other forms of grounded theory in 
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order to avoid any positivist assumptions being made about the nature of worry (see 
Appendix B for further discussion regarding epistemology). 
 
By using a constructivist grounded theory methodology, the intention is that the resulting 
theory would provide an understanding, rather than an explanation (Charmaz, 2006a), of the 
phenomenon of worry and the ways in which it can come to be experienced by individuals as 
problematic. The focus is upon the meanings that participants generate out of their 
experiences. The theory then acts as an interpretation of those meanings, in which “causality 
is suggestive, incomplete and indeterminate” rather than claiming to represent a “window on 
reality” (Charmaz, 2000, p523-4), such as might be found within a more objectivist form of 
grounded theory (Charmaz, 2000). 
 
Reflexive Statement 
I am a trainee clinical psychologist, conducting research in part fulfilment of my doctorate 
qualification in clinical psychology. I have worked within the mental health field for the last 
5 years. During that time I have worked with a range of patients, a large proportion of whom 
have reported worry as a frequent experience. I am aware of a number of treatment 
approaches related to worry and have utilised these at different times with varying success. 
This professional exposure along with personal experiences of worry has led to a significant 
interest in this area, and a desire to explore in depth the subjective experience of worry. 
 
Based upon my awareness of interventions aimed at reducing worry, specifically involving 
CBT approaches, it is inevitable that these would have some impact upon my perception of 
the topic. Through reflection, I was able to identify potential expectations that may have 
influenced the research process. These included the assumptions that worry is a cognitive 
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process, that participants would perceive worry in a negative light and that they would seek to 
reduce the amount of worry they experienced. In order to limit the activation of these 
assumptions, I was careful in my construction of the interview schedules to avoid asking any 
questions which may have led the participant to responding in a certain way. Questions were 
as open as possible in order to allow participants to express themselves freely. In order to 
provide a deeper level of scrutiny, the interview schedules were also reviewed by the research 
supervisors who were aware of the possible bias caused by my professional and personal 
experiences. During the actual interviews, I was mindful of the prior assumptions I may have 
brought to the process. I critically explored the reasoning behind any areas concerning the 
experience of worry which I explored further with participants. The use of line-by-line coding 
in the initial stage of analysis ensured that the development of codes stayed close to the 
participants’ words and meanings, which again was triangulated by the research supervisors 
at various stages of the coding process. 
 
Participants 
Twelve participants took part in the study (6 male, 6 female), with ages ranging from 20 to 
64. Table 2.1 (pg.45) details the key demographics for each participant. It was initially 
predicted that between ten and fifteen participants would be sufficient to reach theoretical 
saturation.  No new meaningful codes were identified after the tenth interview had been 
coded. At this stage, it was felt that theoretical saturation had been reached. Two further 
participants were then interviewed in an attempt to validate the resultant theory. All 
participants were under the care of a mental health service, and although many were 
diagnosed with a mental health condition, e.g. Emotionally Unstable Personality Disorder, 
this was not true in all cases. The main study inclusion criterion was participants recording a 
score of two or more (on at least half the days over the previous two weeks) against the 
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following questions: a) I am not able to stop or control worrying, b) I worry too much about 
different things. These questions were taken from the GAD-7 questionnaire (Spitzer, 
Kroenke, Williams & Lowe, 2006), which is described below. The questions were intended 
to identify participants who were experiencing worry at the upper end of the intensity and 
impact continua. If participants scored two or more against these questions, they were 
considered to be experiencing worry at the upper end of the frequency continuum. It was 
hoped that such participants would be “experts in the phenomena under investigation” 
(Bryant & Charmaz, 2007, p231) and would be able to provide richer narratives about the 
“optimal rather than the average experience” (Bryant & Charmaz, 2007, p234) rather than 
individuals who report mild, occasional worry that does not cause any difficulties.  
 
Table 2.1 
Demographic information of participants 
No Gender Age Service recruited 
from 
Diagnosis/ 
Main difficulty 
1 Female 41 Secondary Care Emotionally Unstable Personality Disorder 
2 Female 46 Secondary Care Emotionally Unstable Personality Disorder 
3 Male 37 Secondary Care Emotionally Unstable Personality Disorder 
4 Male 29 Primary Care Health Anxiety 
5 Female 23 Primary Care Obsessive Compulsive Disorder 
6 Female 64 Secondary Care Bipolar Disorder 
7 Male 25 Primary Care Worry 
8 Male 20 Primary Care Generalised Anxiety Disorder 
9 Female 22 Primary Care Generalised Anxiety Disorder 
10 Female 20 Primary Care Low Self-Esteem 
11 Male 28 Primary Care Generalised Anxiety Disorder 
12 Male 20 Primary Care Adjustment 
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Sample 
Four participants were recruited from a Community Mental Health service and eight 
participants from a primary care Student Mental Health service, both in the north-west of 
England. The Community Mental Health service provided secondary care support to 
individuals whose mental health needs required care co-ordination and a multi-disciplinary 
approach. The Student Mental Health service supported students from the local university at 
the primary care level. A clinical sample was chosen for the reasons detailed above. The 
choice of both services was made in order to allow for a broad mix of socio-demographic and 
mental health presentations, to increase the variability in the sample. 
 
Materials 
The GAD-7 questionnaire (Spitzer et al, 2006) was developed as a brief self-report measure 
that could be used as a screening tool for GAD. The GAD-7 is used routinely in many mental 
health settings to ascertain the presence and level of worrying and anxiety and to inform a 
potential diagnosis of GAD.  
 
Items 2 (Not being able to stop or control worrying) and 3 (Worrying too much about 
different things) from the GAD-7 questionnaire were used as inclusion criteria for the study. 
These were the only items that related specifically to worry. It was felt that individuals who 
scored 2 or more (i.e. a frequency of half the days or more over the last 2 weeks) on either of 
these GAD-7 questionnaire items, that this indicated that they were experiencing a level of 
worry that was frequent, intense and impacting on their lives. These individuals were 
considered  suitable for the study. 
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A participant information sheet (See Appendix C) was developed which described the 
purpose of the study, the procedure involved, the potential risks and benefits of taking part 
and assurances regarding confidentiality and governance. A consent form (See Appendix D) 
was also created which highlighted the most important aspects of the study that the 
participant needed to be aware of and explicitly consent to. 
 
Procedure 
Ethical Approval. Permission for the study to take place was granted by the 
University of Liverpool DClinPsy Research Review Committee (Appendix E), by the NHS 
Research Ethics Committee (Appendix F) and finally by the local research and development 
departments in both of the trusts that participants were recruited from (Appendix G) 
 
Recruitment. Participants were identified by a Clinical Psychologist working in the 
mental health service in each trust, who both acted as supervisors for the study. Participants 
who had indicated during assessment that they experienced worry (and whose risk profile 
was felt not to preclude them from taking part in the study) were asked to rate themselves on 
the two questions from the GAD-7, as described above. If participants scored more than 2 on 
either item, they were asked if they would like to take part in the study and they were then 
given a Participant Information Sheet. After a week’s consideration period, they were 
contacted by the researcher to ask if they had any questions about the study and if they would 
still like to be involved. Participants who indicated that they wanted to take part in the study 
were provided with an appointment for a one-hour interview, to take place within the relevant 
mental health service building. Prior to the commencement of the interview, participants were 
given a further opportunity to ask any questions about the study. Participants who indicated 
that they still wanted to take part were then asked to sign a consent form. 
61 
 
 
It was hoped that a sampling frame could be built from clients in the recruitment sites who 
expressed a willingness to take part in the study and met the inclusion criteria. This would 
have allowed for future participants to be selected on the basis of any significant emerging 
themes (theoretical sampling). Unfortunately, the volume of available clients was 
significantly less than anticipated, and convenience sampling was the only option available, 
with no participants excluded. However, this did not represent as much of a limitation as 
might have been the case, since the process of analysis did not indicate any characteristics for 
which theoretical sampling would have been necessary (see Results section for further 
information). 
 
Data Collection. An initial interview schedule was devised which was used to guide 
the interviews. Interview questions were devised on the basis of the study objectives (Berg, 
2001) and the researcher’s preliminary reading around the topic (Strauss & Corbin, 1998). 
Open questions were used as much as possible in order to allow participants to tell their story 
with as little leading as possible, e.g “Tell me about your experience of worry”, “How does 
worrying make you feel?”, “Is there anything that changes how/whether you worry?” Before 
the first interview took place, interview questions were discussed with both research 
supervisors. Any questions that were too closed or appeared to contain a bias towards 
particular conceptualisations of worry were modified or removed, e.g. “Is worrying a 
problem for you?” In line with the grounded theory approach, the interview schedule was 
reviewed after the first five interviews had been coded and analysed. The interview process 
was reviewed again after the next five interviews, in order to explore the emerging themes 
and to test hypotheses (See Appendix H for the initial interview schedule and Appendix I for 
its subsequent development).  
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Interviews were recorded on a digital audio recorder. The first two interview recordings were 
transcribed by the researcher in order that he was able to immerse himself in the data as early 
as possible. Subsequent interviews were then transcribed by a University of Liverpool 
approved transcriber. The researcher listened to all audio recordings to ensure the 
transcriptions were accurate. All recordings and transcripts were anonymised and stored on a 
secure password-protected computer. 
 
Data Analysis. Analysis of the interview data was guided by the framework proposed 
by Charmaz (2006a). This primarily comprised initial, focused and theoretical coding using 
active and in-vivo codes wherever possible. Summaries, diagramming and memo-writing, 
were also utilised to engage with the data and develop the emerging coding, structure and 
theory.  
 
Initial coding involved a process of line-by-line coding, which was utilised for the first three 
interviews. From the first three interviews, a review of the most commonly used and 
meaningful codes led to the production of the preliminary focused codes. These were then 
used to code subsequent interview transcripts, with additions and refinements made to the list 
of focused codes as the analysis progressed. Theoretical categories were drawn from the 
focussed codes to explain the emerging theory. An illustration of initial codes, focused codes 
and theoretical categories is provided in Table 2.2 (pg.49). The researcher’s supervisors 
provided corroboration of codes, categories and overall theory at regular points during the 
analysis. NVIVO software was used for the focussed coding stage, which provided the ability 
to manage, store and interrogate the expanding coding structure and database of coded data. 
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Table 2.2 
Example of the coding process 
Transcript Initial Code Focussed Code Theoretical 
Category 
P: it’s just going over stuff in your head and getting 
panicky about it, erm anything really like I was 
worrying about coming here this morning, it was 
going through my head “should I do it shouldn’t I do 
it” start questioning yourself then the anxiety starts 
and you get all the effects of the anxiety just like 
shaking, sweating, tearful, yeah 
 
R: So is that how you would define worry then if you 
were trying to explain it someone who’d never heard 
the word? 
 
P: Yeah the thing with me is I’ve got a problem, I was 
never allowed to show emotions or anything growing 
up so I’m still learning what feelings are and things 
like that so it’s hard for me to actually explain in 
words, what an emotion is and like worry I suppose is 
an emotion, so yeah, but the way I do see it is like you 
over think things, erm its like if you’re going to the 
dentist this afternoon you’ll like just panic “oh I’m at 
the dentist I’m at the dentist” it’s on your mind and 
it’s like “what could happen, what’s gonna happen” 
you come up with assumptions, judgements and just 
get yourself in a stupid state 
 
In your head 
Getting panicky 
Pervasive 
Future-focussed 
Going through my 
head; Talking to self; 
Dilemma; 
Questioning self 
Linked to anxiety 
 
Physical effects 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Having a problem 
Linked to upbringing 
Not allowed to show 
emotions 
Learning about 
emotions 
Difficulty expressing 
emotions 
Worry is an emotion 
 
 
 
Overthinking 
Worrying about 
everyday events; 
Future-focussed 
On your mind 
 
Trying to predict the 
future 
Creating assumptions 
and judgements 
Blaming self; Stupid 
state 
Seriously dwell 
 
 
 
Doubting self/ 
others/future 
 
 
Identifying the 
negative 
consequences 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Link to personal 
factors 
Having to 
hide/suppress 
emotions 
 
 
 
Worry is an 
emotion 
 
 
Seriously dwell 
 
 
 
 
 
Catastrophising 
 
 
 
Identifying the 
negative 
consequences 
 
 
Grappling 
mentally 
 
 
 
 
Trying to 
make sense of 
worry 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Link to 
personal 
factors 
 
 
 
 
Emphasizing 
the emotional 
component 
 
 
 
Grappling 
mentally 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Trying to 
make sense of 
worry 
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Throughout the entire analysis process, constant comparison took place between participants, 
narratives, codes and data, and memos were regularly written to record apparent themes, 
relationships and hypotheses (See Appendix J for example memos). 
 
Since many of the techniques adopted in the data analysis process were dependent on the 
findings that emerged at each stage, full details are provided in the results section.  
 
Results 
Analysis 
When the initial coding of the first three interviews had been completed, it became apparent 
that the amount and complexity of information contained in each narrative was substantial. In 
order to manage this, a decision was taken by the researcher to analyse each interview not 
only at a micro level, through coding, but also concurrently at a macro level, by producing a 
one page summary, along with a diagrammatic illustration of each participant’s description of 
their experience of worry (Appendix K). This enabled the dominant themes, relationships and 
structure within the narratives to become more apparent, which then aided the ongoing 
coding process. 
 
After the first five interviews had been conducted, coded and analysed, a period of in-depth 
review and reflection took place. This resulted in the generation of a composite summary and 
diagram (Appendix L) of the key themes and processes that had emerged from the 
participants’ accounts up to this point. A range of hypotheses were drawn from this working 
model. A number of modifications were made to the interview schedule to enable these 
hypotheses to be tested. Although the first five participants represented a reasonable diversity 
in terms of age, gender, mental health presentation and recruitment site, it was hoped that 
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theoretical sampling would be possible for the next tranche of participants. However, at this 
point in the analysis, there did not appear to be any divergent paths in the working model 
linked to specific participant features that could guide the selection process. However in some 
ways this was a fortunate outcome, since the lack of available participants meant that 
theoretical sampling would not actually have been possible. 
 
After the tenth interview had been coded and summarised, a further period of intense analysis 
was commenced. Again, no obvious participant ‘types’ were identified, but in order to be 
certain these had not been missed, a further analytical approach was adopted. Distinguishing 
characteristics of each narrative were distilled into a paragraph summary, participant and 
narrative characteristics were tabulated and a repertory grid technique (Winter, 1992) was 
utilised in order to reveal any prominent similarities and patterns (Appendix M). This 
confirmed that no ‘types’ existed and that the working model was unidirectional in form, 
rather than differential.  
 
For narrative characteristics that were shared by seven or more participants, a composite 
summary and diagram was again produced. This represented the draft theory, incorporating 
the elements that would be considered the theoretical codes. Finally, an interview schedule 
was developed on the basis of the draft theory. This interview schedule aimed to understand 
the extent that the theory could be supported. Two additional participants were recruited for 
this purpose, with their narratives transcribed, coded and summarised. The analysis of these 
transcripts supported a large proportion of the theory and the underlying categories. 
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Storyline Memo 
In grounded theory, Strauss and Corbin (1998) suggest using a storyline memo to outline the 
model before introducing the theoretical categories from which the model has been 
developed. Therefore, before exploring in detail the main categories and sub-categories that 
were identified in the analysis process, the storyline memo is presented, comprising the 
common narrative, shared by the majority of participants. This ultimately represents the 
finalised narrative version of the theory of worry suggested by this study, which is depicted 
visually by the composite diagram, in Figure 2 (pg.53). 
 
Distressing life experiences were consistently put forward by participants as a causal factor in 
their past and current worrying. These life experiences generally entailed an actual or 
anticipated social or physical threat, where the person felt alone, different or abandoned, 
leading to an enduring fear and vulnerability towards the specific threat(s). Possibly in 
response to this feared threat(s), participants spoke of a need to protect and prove themselves. 
In addition to over-achieving and perfectionism, this need also appears to have been met 
through imagining possible outcomes that may occur in the near or distant future. This 
appears to be depicted as a rational and intentional form of worrying. The justification for this 
process seems to be derived from a number of positive beliefs about worry which were held 
by most participants, in conjunction with other general beliefs, for example: “worrying is 
normal/everyone worries” and the fact that worrying has been a lifelong experience for the 
person. 
 
However, an escalating worry process also seemed to exist, which participants described as 
being out of control, irrational or even pathological. This process appeared to develop in the 
presence of a trigger/s linked to their underlying fear and vulnerability, and/or a “worried 
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feeling”, often identified as anxiety. In this context, participants spoke about imagined 
catastrophic outcomes and “what-if” questions that felt real and which they struggled to 
ignore or resist.  
 
The “worried feeling” appears to intensify. The worry process was then experienced as being 
out of their control. The consequences of this ‘out-of-control’ worry are various but 
uniformly negative. The recognition and/or recollection of when this worry process was 
activated in the past seemed to undermine the individual’s confidence in their ability to cope, 
both at the time and into the future. Most participants spoke of ‘in-control’ worry and ‘out-of-
control’ worry as being inevitable, as if it is pre-programmed into their brain, ostensibly 
linked to their early negative experiences and the fact that  worrying had been lifelong. 
 
In spite of the negative consequences of ‘out-of-control’ worry, typically described as stupid 
or pointless, many participants continued to emphasise the positive value of worry and its 
ubiquity. It is possible that this is a manifestation of their need to prove or defend themselves 
to others (and themselves) against imagined accusations of acting irrationally. By 
rationalising and justifying worry as worthwhile and necessary, they may then feel those 
imagined accusations have been challenged and their fragile self-confidence has been 
temporarily bolstered.  
 
A strong theme running through most participants’ narratives was the emphasis placed on 
how emotionally distressing worry could be, especially in reference to worry being an 
emotion or inextricably linked to anxiety. There also seemed to be a sense for many of the 
participants that the distress or ‘seriousness’ associated with their worry was not recognised  
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Negative life 
experience 
Feeling alone/ 
different 
Need to 
protect self 
Worry is 
normal 
Lifelong 
Positive Beliefs 
Protects, prepares, 
motivates me 
Need to 
prove self 
Imagining  
possible outcomes 
Worried 
feeling 
Becomes 
intense 
Catastrophic 
”what ifs” 
Become 
real 
OUT OF CONTROL 
Negative 
consequences Positive 
modifiers 
Fear of social/ 
physical threat 
TRIGGER 
Noticing/remembering 
inability to cope 
Emphasising the 
emotional component 
“IT’S WORSE  
FOR ME” 
DISEASED 
INEVITABLE 
MACHINE 
Negative 
modifiers 
IN CONTROL 
Link to personal factors 
Trying to make sense of worry 
Emphasizing the emotional component 
Grappling mentally 
Worry modifiers 
Figure 2 
Diagrammatic illustration of the storyline memo 
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or validated by others, such as parents or professionals, hence the need for it to be stressed 
during their interviews. 
 
In addition to a focus on the negative consequences of worry increasing the intensity of the 
problematic worry process, all participants spoke of other factors that affected how much 
worried thinking and emotion they experienced. Negative modifiers, that raised worry levels 
and distress, included isolating themselves, relying on sleep, food, reassurance seeking and 
frantic activity. Positive modifiers, which seemed to reduce their worrying generally related 
to talking and sharing their experiences with trusted others, such as friends or professionals, 
and engaging in self-help techniques, such as mindfulness. 
 
Overview of Theoretical Categories 
The analysis of the data resulted in five theoretical categories: 1) Link to personal factors, 2) 
Emphasising the emotional component, 3) Grappling mentally, 4) Trying to make sense of 
worry, and 5) Worry modifiers. A number of sub-categories underlie each of the theoretical 
categories, although these do not map perfectly onto the composite diagram shown in Figure 
2 (pg.53). This is due to the concurrent analytical processes of coding and 
diagramming/summarising, as described above, which generated slight variations in the lower 
level elements. The subcategories married to the focussed codes from the coding process 
were chosen to structure the write-up. These sub-categories are directly linked to the 
participants’ quotes, which are used to illustrate and support the results. Table 2.3 (pg.56) 
shows the hierarchy of theoretical categories and sub-categories. 
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Table 2.3 
Hierarchy of theoretical categories and sub-categories 
Theoretical Category 1
st
 Tier Sub-Category 2
nd
 Tier Sub-Category 
1. Link to personal 
factors 
1.1. Experience of trauma, 
abandonment, isolation or loss 
 
 1.2. Striving for perfection, 
control or certainty 
 
 1.3. Worry role models  
 1.4. Lifelong, part of my 
identity 
 
 1.5. Feeling my worry isn’t 
really appreciated 
 
2. Emphasising the 
emotional component 
  
3. Grappling mentally 3.1. “Seriously dwell”  
 3.2. Catastrophising  
 3.3. Doubting self, others or 
future 
 
 3.4. Searching for a solution, 
striving for perfection or 
control 
 
4. Trying to make sense 
of worry 
4.1. Focusing on the negative 4.1.1. Having a life of its 
own 
  4.1.2. Diseased inevitable 
machine 
  4.1.3. Identifying the 
negative consequences 
 4.2. Staying aware of the bright 
side 
4.2.1. Defending the 
instinctive value of worry 
  4.2.2. Rationally identifying 
the positives 
 4.3. Sensing the dilemma  
5. Worry modifiers 5.1. Worry triggers  
 5.2. Escalating the worry   
 5.3. Minimising and 
ameliorating the worry 
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1. Link to personal factors. This category refers to the connections that appeared to 
exist between participants’ worry and aspects of themselves and their lives. This comprised 
links to their personal and family histories, personality traits, recurrent needs and fears, and 
enduring beliefs about themselves and other people. It is not necessarily the case that these 
factors actually played a causal role in terms of the onset and development of their worry.    
However, it is nonetheless significant that participants felt it important to focus on these parts 
of their lives during the interview process. 
 
1.1. Experience of trauma, abandonment, isolation or loss. Virtually all participants 
constructed a pathway from the difficult experiences that occurred either in their childhood or 
adolescence to their on-going experience of worry. These experiences included traumatic 
exposure to health risks, physical dangers and mortality:  
 
“I began worrying after I had pancreatitis…it was horrible it’s very painful and I 
could have died because of that” (P4, line 263-266) 
 
or actual or imagined abandonment, loss or isolation:  
 
“I didn’t know if she was going to come out [of hospital] or whatever and then being 
dumped on somebody I hardly knew and it just seemed to start from there” (P6, line 
112-113) 
 
For some participants, it was the amalgam of a number negative events that they attributed to 
their worry: 
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“there is so much that’s gone on and I think it’s just coz a lots happened in the past I 
think the worries are just, I don’t know how to explain it really I think it’s just a 
symptom of through everything that’s happened that I’ve got all these worries” (P3, 
p5) 
 
Although tentative, many participants expanded further on why these experiences might have 
contributed to their worrying, through a shift in how they perceived and thought about 
themselves, others and the future:  
 
“at school, I was always compared to my sister, so I always had the worry there that I 
had to behave like she behaved, erm, but yeah it came from childhood definitely” (P1, 
p51) 
 
1.2. Striving for perfection, control or certainty. Most participants characterised 
themselves as perfectionists or at least prone to placing excessive pressure on themselves to 
achieve high standards of performance and control: 
 
“I’ve always been a perfectionist…like 98% in a Physics exam wasn’t good enough, 
so I’ve always had to push push push” (P1, 18) 
 
Some also indicated that, instead of pushing themselves to extreme levels, the control and 
perfection they sought may have led them to avoid activities altogether, through a fear of 
failure and its dreaded consequences: 
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“definitely a fear of failure, to the point where I’ll not try anything cos of that worry 
about failing it, so I don’t try doing it” (P11, 209-211) 
 
These behaviours appear to stem from a need to prove and protect themselves, linked to the 
difficult experiences described in the previous category. 
 
“you are not enough in a way and maybe that’s the basic thing now that makes me 
worrying about becoming the person who is enough and when I say enough I mean in 
terms of abilities and skills and degrees and all this stuff in a way” (P4, 347-350) 
 
As well as being a response to life events, two participants suggested that their perfectionist 
traits were a result of success/achievement initially being attained with relative ease, which 
then became their own and others’ expectation. Nonetheless, these participants still indicated 
that this characteristic was essentially a way to protect themselves against potential threats 
and avoid their vulnerabilities becoming exposed. 
 
“I knew that I’d became a perfectionist from somewhere…I set the bar early on so 
like I’d just get 100% in everything so then I would push myself to get that every time 
but it didn’t become an issue until later on I guess” (P8, 404-409) 
 
1.3. Worry role models. It is unsurprising (given the general ubiquity of worry) that 
over half of the participants talked about having individuals in their lives who they 
considered to worry much like themselves. For some, this appeared to be just an observation 
of the similarity in their personalities: 
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“I know that my Mum, she’s quite a like a nervous disposition/worrier kind of 
person” (P8, 251-252) 
 
Other participants identified a causal connection between having someone close to them who 
worried noticeably and their own worrying: 
 
“I think like that’s obviously rubbed off on me her kind of worrying 'cause I 
obviously hear her saying things” (P10, 156-158) 
 
It is unknown whether a person (or persons) close to such participants was instrumental in the 
development of their worry. The fact that participants believed these individuals to be 
‘worriers’ may at least have led these participants to feel as if they had a kindred spirit or a 
‘worry role model’. 
 
1.4. Lifelong, part of my identity. For most of the participants, worrying was 
described as being a lifelong behaviour, which had occurred for as long as they could 
remember: 
 
“I can remember being in cot even, worrying that nobody were going to come to me.” 
(P2, p3) 
 
This appeared to have led to an acceptance about worrying being part of their life. Lifelong 
worry appeared to negatively justify the continuation of worry, based upon the assumption 
that they knew no other way of coping: 
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“if worry was gone I’d feel awful because I don’t know how I would react…because 
I’ve gotten used to it” (P8, 650-651) 
 
In a positive sense, worry was defined as a key aspect of participants’ identity: “it’s who I 
am” (P1, p63). This also hinted at the idea that worry is inevitable and that it is futile trying to 
stop, which is explored more directly in the category “Diseased inevitable machine”. 
 
1.5. Feeling my struggle isn't really appreciated. Throughout the descriptions 
participants gave about the difficulties they had experienced in their lives, including their 
challenging periods of worry, there was the suggestion that they did not feel their struggle 
had truly been appreciated: “I didn’t get a sense of the feeling that people understood” (P8, 
391-392). This appears to have been inferred from what others said or did: 
 
 “as soon as that imaginary bell had gone at 9 o’clock [I was] perfectly 
alright...reading, doing all sorts then my mum used to get, not angry with me but she 
used to get cross with me 'cause she used to say I knew there was nothing wrong with 
you” (P6, 215-218) 
 
or expectations about how others might react: 
 
“I didn’t go to the doctors about that because I was having the panic attacks so 
everything I told them would have just been oh well it’s like your anxiety” (P10, 30-
32) 
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This reactivated and reinforced the isolation and abandonment that many participants 
described. However, it is also possible that others’ lack of understanding may have arisen 
from a tendency to conceal or suppress their struggle: 
 
“I think I’m very good at hiding it, like my friends would have absolutely no idea that 
I’m sitting here today. I only told my mum and dad about a year ago and they were 
really surprised and I’ve lived with them for 23 years” (P11, 89-92) 
 
2. Emphasizing the emotional component. The emotional aspects of worry was 
highlighted in other contexts, such as being a negative consequence of worrying or acting as a 
worry trigger. In addition, there was an arguably more important sense that appeared to be 
conveyed in participants’ narratives. This involved a noticeable emphasis being placed on 
how intrinsic the emotional component was to the experience of worry, with the potential 
implication that they felt this had been underrepresented or suppressed thus far: 
 
“all these are worries and they are not something separate from my feelings because 
let’s put it like we had one of the lectures saying that how to separate cognition and 
emotions and I don’t believe that’s possible at least for me because I cannot worry 
about something i.e thinking about something and not experiencing emotional distress 
that’s impossible I feel it both together when I’m worrying about something I feel like 
shit” (P4, 66-72) 
 
In a similar vein, it often seemed like they were attempting to emphasise just how intolerable 
worry felt for them: 
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“having all this worry that goes up and down as I try and you know avoid the initial 
problem.  Its progressively more draining and I just rather give up and go to sleep or 
take some diazepam or whatever and run away from it” (P7, 488-491) 
 
especially when it was compared to the experiences of others: 
 
“I find it really sometimes really difficult to cope with the worry in a what I’d say is 
probably someone else might cope with it better and it might not be as distressing to 
them where to me the worry’s very distressing and very negative and it can really 
alter my mood” (P3, p45) 
 
This theme has parallels with the category “Feeling my struggle isn’t really appreciated”, in 
that an enduring sense of not being understood or acknowledged complicates the experience 
of worry, implying to a need for this too to be properly recognised. 
 
3. Grappling mentally. All participant descriptions suggested that a significant 
amount of cognitive strain was involved during episodes of worry. The indication was that 
participants were desperately trying to anticipate how bad situations might become and how 
much their capacity to face those situations might be impaired. This was followed by 
attempts to work out how they could deal with such scenarios. The natural course of this 
cognitive processing often seemed to evolve into more and more mental turmoil and self-
doubt. 
 
3.1. “Seriously dwell” (P3, p11). Participants spoke of “obsessing” (P10, line 11) on 
thoughts or images, like a hunter with its prey: “I will fixate on the worry and I won’t let go 
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of it” (P2, p7). For some, this process lasted “for days on end” (P11, line 50-51), with the 
topic examined over and over: 
 
“one thing will come into my mind and I’ll start thinking about it and then, erm, I’ll 
just look into it more and more” (P2, 78-79) 
 
As this process persisted, this would become increasingly repetitive and frustrating: 
 
“I will try and relate that to me in why why I don’t understand this, what haven’t I 
learnt before, what do I need to learn alongside this and I’ll just and that goes round in 
circles” (P7, 338-340) 
 
3.2. Catastrophising. For all participants, at some stage their worry episode would 
involve catastrophizing about the consequences of a past, current or future event, “what if 
that happens or what if that…what if what if all these what ifs” (P4, 466-468). This appeared 
to take place in a number of ways, including a sudden escalation of catastrophic thinking and 
imagining:  
 
“I’d get a pain in my leg and I’d there was just no doubt about it like I'd just think that 
it was a blood clot or I’d have a headache and it was going to be a brain tumour” 
(P10, 37-39) 
 
For other participants, the catastrophising appeared to be a more systematic process, going 
through all possible scenarios, or else involved a descriptive and graphic elaboration: 
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“then just start to picture me like collapsing and then like ambulances coming and like 
de de de and I like make the story quickly it might only last like 10 seconds in my 
head all the way to me like being in hospital and then dying” (P10, 331-336) 
 
At other times, participants talked of becoming so immersed in the catastrophizing process 
that fantasy effectively became an awful reality: 
 
“it’s almost like I’m making it happen in my head, it’s almost like I am living it,  yes I 
am almost living it” (P2, p7) 
 
3.3. Doubting self, others or future. As well as anticipating the most extreme dangers 
or risks present in situations, worry episodes also seemed to involve significant doubt about 
their actions and the impact upon their self-esteem: 
 
“if I’ve assembled a table or put something together I’ll kind of doubt it’s like self-
doubt” (P3, p16) 
 
“that’s worrying and it’s not I don’t think, it’s not being perfect, its worrying that 
what I do won’t be good enough” (P6, 707-708) 
 
3.4. Searching for a solution, striving for perfection or control. Although predictions 
of a dreadful future with hopeless prospects might be perceived as a somewhat self-defeating 
exercise, this process may actually be a means to an end, with the actual goal being to 
identify a solution, reach perfection or achieve some form of control: 
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“All my attention was I mean I was always trying to figure out how to how to resolve 
that problem” (P5, 473-474) 
 
 
This has an obvious relationship with the category “Striving for perfection, control or 
certainty”, where the worry takes place, to a certain degree, in order to compensate for 
specific underlying needs. Unfortunately, in spite of the intense effort to meet these needs, 
the process continues to result in dissatisfaction and confusion: 
 
“why I don’t understand this, what haven’t I learnt before, what do I need to learn 
alongside this and I’ll just and that goes round in circles because there is no answer to 
that question there is no real solution that I can find going round and round” (P7, 338-
342) 
 
4. Trying to make sense of worry. This theoretical category relates to occasions 
where participants described worry as a prominent feature of their lives, in terms of its impact 
and how challenging it was to understand. The most significant aspect of this was in relation 
to the conflict that seemed to arise between the difficulties worry was felt to cause and the 
advantages it seemed to provide. 
 
4.1. Focusing on the negative. There were a number of distinct strands to this sub-
category which were felt to be significant enough to detail separately 
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4.1.1. Having a life of its own. A commonly occurring element, which all participants 
gave examples of, related to how worry was often experienced as occurring outside of their 
awareness or control: 
 
“I’ve always felt that they were involuntary for want of a better word and that I’d no 
control over them” (P6, 471-473) 
 
Where the person was not aware of the worry process, a physical feeling would highlight to 
them that the worrying is or was taking place:  
 
“my body felt worried I just sat out there and I could feel it I was just worrying” (P2, 
p61) 
 
The suggestion seems to have been that worry could sometimes be experienced as emanating 
from something separate to the individual that functioned independently: 
 
“when I’m trying to think about the material whether its chemistry or whatever these 
thoughts do creep in and once they creep in, they occupy a space along with the part 
of me that’s trying to think about the material” (P7, 362-365) 
 
Where the locus of control for the worry was positioned externally to the self, the worry was 
often described as manifesting itself and exerting its influence in unpredictable ways: 
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“It just it can just go up, down, up, down whenever it feels like it.  I can be doing 
something I enjoy, I’ll worry more, I can be doing something I really don’t like and 
not worry at all” (P8, 41-44) 
 
In these instances, the content of worry was described as being forced on the individual in 
such a way that it was felt to be undeniably and irresistibly real and true, and had to be dealt 
with: 
“it’s almost like someone’s giving me a load of worries on a plate and saying there 
you go ****, there’s your worry for this month and then when it’s gone they will 
come back and say there’s another one for you” (P3, p7) 
 
There was a clear sense that the experience of worry was felt to occur on a continuum of 
intensity. Where worry was less intense, it appears to have been viewed as being normal, 
voluntary and under control: 
 
“I was prone to worry but I didn’t worry like I am worrying now about something not 
obsessively not like every day or not in so much tense it were just like normal 
worries” (P4, 338-340) 
 
However, the transition to worry being seen as less intentional or even a separate entity 
appeared to be linked to it reaching intense levels: 
 
“once its escalated then it’s hard to kind of ignore because it’s become a thing” (P10, 
448-449) 
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4.1.2. Diseased inevitable machine. When participants spoke of worry being intense 
and “off-the-scale” (P1, p17), they often conveyed the idea that its emergence was a constant 
and inescapable fact: 
 
“one worry will be with me for months or several months and then that worry kind of 
goes it disappears and I get a new one to replace it so it’s like that vicious circle it’s 
like a never ending path of worries that one will come and then that will go I don’t 
know why it goes and then I’ll get another one” (P3, p36) 
 
In line with the “Link to Personal Factors”, this inevitability was frequently attributed to the 
personality style of the participant: 
 
“I can’t help it that’s just the way I am, it would make it harder for me to just like 
harder for me to control worrying because I just kind of thought I can’t help it that’s 
what I do” (P9, 242-244) 
 
to events that had occurred in the past: 
 
“the fact is there were problems you know undiagnosed, un-dealt with which meant 
when they did manifest themselves things were derailed and I didn’t know what to do 
about that and therefore it spiralled” (P7, 143-146) 
 
or simply due to the fact that once worrying has occurred for enough time, then like a habit, it 
will always take place and it is better to just let it happen rather than trying to resist: 
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“I’m so used to worrying that it’s like second nature, it’s just like breathing” (P1, p10) 
 
 
 
For some, the impression gained is that worry was unavoidable due to its inherent 
mechanism, which when triggered, would crank into life and could not be stopped: 
 
“it’s like I suppose a robot goes into overdrive and you know my heads just absolutely 
it feels like it’s going to explode and that is when I can’t, I can’t bring any of these 
tools into, into play because I’ve got beyond that because there’s too many, I’ve got 
too many worries” (P6, 765-768) 
 
This apparent machine-like persistence and rigidity of worry was sometimes linked by the 
participant to their diagnosis of a mental illness. Worry was also characterised as a disease in 
its own right, such was its apparent biomechanical nature: 
 
“what do I think about worry, its takes over your life, it’s awful, a disease… it’s like a 
disease I can’t it’s like I can’t control it” (P2, p16) 
 
4.1.3. Identifying the negative consequences. Throughout participants’ narratives, they 
regularly described what they saw as the negative effects of worry. All spoke of worry being 
mentally distracting, leading to a lack of concentration or irrational thinking: 
 
“just not being able to concentrate on things if I was worried a lot, these worries 
would be spinning around in my mind” (P12, 35-36) 
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All of the participants referred to negative emotions that they associated with their worry: 
 
“usually you’ll feel worried and then an anxiety attack will come within a short period 
of time afterwards, or you’ll have a panic attack which comes out of nowhere then a 
period of worry, usually follows it” (P11, 113-115) 
 
Participants also talked about the unpleasant physical consequences of worry (which were 
often the physical symptoms of anxiety experienced during an episode of worry that they 
were describing): 
 
“I was experiencing physical symptoms, I was sweating a bit, racing of the heart and 
really, really bad headache” (P5, 37-39) 
 
A final consequence of worry that participants reported was that it prevented them for living 
a full life and enjoying the moment: 
 
“it makes me dysfunctional I mean I cannot function, I cannot do my everyday life’s 
things that I programme to do in a calm and pleasurable way” (P4, 193-194) 
 
4.2. Staying aware of the bright side. Despite identifying a range of negative aspects 
to worry, participants seemed to be equally keen to emphasise what they felt were the 
benefits of worry. This emerged in two ways, which will be discussed separately. 
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4.2.1. Defending the instinctive value of worry. At times, participants referred to the 
advantages that worry afforded, with what seemed to be a defensive, knee-jerk response, 
when they thought about the prospect of worry not being part of their lives. These included 
the belief that worry protected them, through an advance warning of potential dangers: 
 
 
“sometimes worry is good, you know, even if there’s a car coming at you at sixty 
miles an hour, you’re right to worry, get yourself out of the way” (P11, 282-283) 
 
Worry was believed to motivate participants and give them time to prepare, both practically 
and emotionally, for what might happen: 
 
 “it can be a good thing because erm I’m sort of prepared for things happening, if they 
work out ok that is fantastic if they don’t its bad but at least I was expecting it” (P6, 
681-683) 
 
There was also the view that without worry, one would be a careless and thoughtless person: 
 
“obviously people that don’t worry are just going to go through life not caring…So I 
think there’s benefits in the way that it makes you more like thoughtful and more 
insightful like of other people” (P10, 650-657) 
 
4.2.2. Rationally identifying the positives. A number of participants also offered what 
appeared to be more considered perspectives on how worrying may benefit them, such as by 
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giving them a sense of control or distracting them from more distressing things, even if this 
benefit was recognised as being short-term or illusory: 
 
“also I see it sometimes as a distraction from how I am really feeling as well 
underneath all that worry is a very sad person so that worry almost masks it all, so if I 
were to strip it off but I would be scared of what I saw” (P2, p65) 
 
 4.3. Sensing the dilemma. Potentially as a result of contemplating the positive and 
negative aspects of worry, many participants expressed the dilemma that existed between 
whether they should or should not worry, and the inherent stress and confusion this caused 
them: 
 
“I think I’ve definitely got problems with it, erm, well I know I have, erm, but if 
someone said, “we can kill your worry nerve”, I’d say absolutely not, leave it there” 
(P11, 288-290) 
 
This dilemma seemed to encapsulate the ongoing struggle participants had over trying to 
make sense of worry and to find certainty and direction whilst in the midst in this uncertain 
experience. This struggle at times appeared to descend into a resigned admission that 
ultimately the worrying was pointless, despite what their gut instinct told them about the need 
to worry: 
 
“there’s no point of worrying it doesn’t lead to anything it’s completely useless…all 
the worry I’ve done so far has not amounted to anything just to more problems” (P5, 
600-606)  
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It is interesting to compare this latter quote with the comment above made by the same 
participant, highlighting the conflicting attitudes that the same individual might hold towards 
worry, reinforcing their dilemma.  
 
The resignation expressed by participants seemed to feed the frustration, anger and blame 
towards themselves over their role in allowing the worry to continue: 
“you’re not just worried about the event, you’re frustrated with yourself for allowing 
yourself to erm become worried about it…when it’s over and the worry’s gone, it’s 
frustration again, like why did you let that ruin 2 or 3 days or why did you let that ruin 
a holiday or a couple of pints with your mates” (P11, 80-87) 
 
5. Worry modifiers. A specific dimension to participants’ descriptions of worry 
involved issues that affected the extent to which worry dominated their lives. These were 
both external in nature, such as environmental and social influences, and internal, such as 
participants’ specific thoughts or behaviours. 
 
5.1. Worry triggers. These were specific incidents or experiences, often related to 
negative life events recounted earlier in their narratives, which seemed to provoke an episode 
of worrying. These included domains such as health and mortality, loss of certainty and 
perfection, or even random thoughts and chance encounters: 
 
“I would worry about a lot like people dying and stuff and I if I saw anything on TV 
or like in a film or something it would like really bother me and it would take like a 
few days for me to stop kind of thinking about it” (P9, 141-144) 
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“I tend to get intrusive thoughts quite a lot of the time, so that will sometimes set it 
off, or it might just be something that’s happened during the day it doesn’t necessarily 
have to be something inside my head” (P8, 32-35) 
 
5.2. Escalating the worry. There was a wide range of factors which appeared to 
amplify the worry for participants, in terms of both the frequency and intensity. A number 
related to how safe and at ease the person felt in their environment and the people within it. 
 
This included participants thinking that others were aware of their worrying and judging them 
in some way for it: 
 
“I think it’s just been made worse now because of the way I am acting physically that 
I’m so sort of got this nervousness about me that I’m just thinking oh it’s so obvious 
to people and I hate that which makes it worse” (P10, 87-89) 
 
Alternatively, participants described feeling alone, or intentionally isolating themselves as a 
way of coping, which then led to further worrying: 
 
“when you live on your own constantly you haven’t got anybody you know and that 
that’s one of the things I think where erm mine could get out of control” (P6, 819-
820) 
 
In the face of particular stressors or increasing pressure, it seemed that worry would tend to 
escalate and intensify: 
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“the worry increased dramatically and I think that was because of the pressure of the 
job, so I worried more about everything and as I went on over the years and I moved 
up the ladder and became a Manager the worrying went through the roof really” (P2, 
p11) 
 
 
It also appeared that when participants experienced certain negative emotions, their worry 
would increase. Although they were sometimes unsure why this might be the case, it did 
seem that a feeling of anxiety or a sense of unease could lead to worry in an attempt to 
identify and resolve the underlying cause: 
 
“what am I worried about there is nothing to be worried about but yes I were getting 
anxiety…there is a search for a reason but I couldn’t find one” (P2, p63) 
 
Finally, there was a clear sense in which recollections of episodes of intense worry and the 
debilitating effects, led to further worry centred on participants’ ability to cope now and into 
the future: 
 
“I am worrying all the time about my health and usually that gets stronger when I am 
stressed about something…maybe future events like how would it be to be a 
psychologist with all this worries how would it be to be a father with all this worries” 
(P4, 275-279) 
 
91 
 
5.3. Minimising and ameliorating the worry. Just as there were factors which 
increased participants’ worry, there were also those which helped to reduce worry or lessen 
its impact. Examples given for these tended to relate to the opposite or absence of those 
outlined above, but a number are nonetheless included to enable a deeper appreciation of the 
elements involved.  
Many participants stated that their worry lessened when they were around certain people, 
whom they trusted or simply felt comfortable with: 
 
 “I have noticed that if I am with a particular person who I see, he’s a very laid back 
and I actually feel quite at ease with that person so I can still be worrying but I don’t 
feel, I feel quite comfortable” (P3, p26) 
 
Often, being able to talk to others about how they were feeling or specifically about their 
worry was described as having a positive impact on their worry, due to a release of tension, 
sharing of responsibility or reassurance about how to cope with the worry: 
 
“I do kind of let it out in a really emotional way you know, I get very upset and I 
think a lot of people think “what’s up with L***” and “it’s a shame” and you know I 
do but when I’ve let it out it I feel a bit better for doing that” (P3, p20) 
 
All participants were accessing some form of therapeutic and professional support, and it 
appeared that this was considered to be a positive factor in helping to reduce worry. Again, 
this seems to have been linked to the opportunity to share their experiences and feel they 
were understood and validated. 
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Therapy also appears to have enabled participants to become aware of particular strategies to 
control their worry and general distress, which they used to varying extents: 
 
“I tend to be better now being aware that when I am worrying and stuff because I’ve 
been through the therapy process so I am much more aware of when I am worrying 
and I go ‘ok I’m worrying now’ and then I can take steps to prevent it” (P8, 193-196) 
 
Whereas the preceding items were framed as being constructive and positive influences, there 
were other ways by which participants could limit their worry, which were described more 
negatively, almost with a sense of guilt or shame. These included avoidance, excessive 
planning or reassurance seeking: 
 
“sometimes I get an extension for my essays and all the stuff that I need to do just to 
avoid worrying although I don’t need it I don’t need the extension usually I get my 
essays done 5 days earlier” (P4, 200-202) 
 
or frantically keeping busy, over-sleeping and over-eating as a form of distraction: 
 
“you see the way I coped with worry was I would use food to push down, I’ve used 
food since I were about 18 to push worry down… when I were worrying, I could eat 
something and it would feel like it would push it down it would literally like just get 
rid of it in a way, ease it, ease it were like taking a tablet really” (P2, p18) 
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Discussion 
The current study sought to develop a model of worry based upon the first-hand accounts of 
individuals who reported significant levels of worrying, using a robust qualitative 
methodology. The analysis and synthesis processes were guided by grounded theory. The 
social constructivist variant (Charmaz, 2006) of grounded theory was utilised in order to 
minimise any positivistic bias that may have been present. The research generated a number 
of theoretical categories and sub-categories and in line with the social constructivist 
paradigm, these categories and the final model are intended as an interpretation of 
participants’ accounts of their experiences rather than as a representation of an objective 
reality. 
 
Summary of findings 
The aims of the study were:  
 To explore how worry is perceived, characterised and understood in a group of 
individuals who report worry as being a significant aspect of their lives 
 To develop a theory of worry based on this exploration which may provide an insight into 
why worry can become problematic 
 
The final model, which is described in detail in the storyline memo in the results section 
above, can be summarised as follows: distressing past experiences lead to a persistent and 
enduring focus upon anticipated future events, as a means of self-protection. At times, this 
focus, or worry, can feel under control and ‘normal’; at other times, especially in the presence 
of a trigger connected to those past experiences, worry can feel intense and out of control. 
The consequences when worry starts to feel this way are uniformly negative and then 
intensify the perceived need to worry. Factors that also act as worry accelerants are that 
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individuals feel their worry is inevitable and not under their control; that the emotional 
impact of their worry is not appreciated or acknowledged; and that they are disturbed about 
whether they should actually be worrying or not. 
 
The theoretical categories that underpin this model are introduced individually, including a 
discussion about where each category appears to support existing research and where it may 
provide a new or enhanced contribution to the literature. The model as a whole is then 
compared with the main theories of worry described in the introduction to the paper. Finally, 
the clinical implications and methodological considerations of the study along with 
suggestions for future research are discussed. Some of the research described is focused not 
solely on worry, but more widely on GAD, and involves participants that have been either 
diagnosed with or who scored highly on measures of this disorder. Although the findings 
from these studies might be considered to relate to more than the phenomenon of worry 
alone, they are still included as they offer some interesting points of comparison with the 
current study. 
 
Comparison between Present Findings and Past Research 
Grappling mentally 
This theoretical category relates to the cognitive struggle that worry seemed to involve for 
participants. This struggle is characterised by an intense pursuit of perfection, certainty or 
control, which often leads to catastrophic predictions about the future and a surfeit of self-
doubt. The sense given seems to be of a process that is repetitive, circular and ultimately 
unproductive. 
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Findings within this theoretical category support existing literature regarding the cognitive 
characteristics of worry. Many studies have indicated that worry incorporates a cognitive 
component (Borkovec et al, 1983; Borkovec & Inz, 1990; Hoyer et al, 2001; York et al, 
1987). This may begin as a problem-solving activity (Davey, Hampton, Farrell & Davidson, 
1992), as an attempt to achieve perfection (Stober & Joorman, 2001), certainty and control 
(Freeston et al, 1994). The current study supports the idea that as worry escalates, this goal 
can become obstructed due to the presence of negative intrusions (Borkovec & Inz, 1990; 
Hoyer et al, 2001; Pruzinsky & Borkovec, 1990; York et al, 1987) and pessimistic or 
catastrophic assessments of future events (Metzger, Miller, Cohen, Sofka & Borkovec, 1990; 
Vasey & Borkovec, 1992). The worry process then becomes intensely focussed on the 
problem, perceiving it as a threat rather than a challenge, resulting in a failure to identify 
potential solutions (Dugas et al, 1995; Dugas et al, 1997). Alternatively, individuals persevere 
in generating solutions, without feeling able to decide which solution to select (Davey & 
Levy, 1998; Startup & Davey, 2001). 
 
The current study enhances the findings from previous studies, in terms of participants’ 
descriptions of problems being forced upon them, which they then felt a responsibility to 
resolve, or else worry over. This appeared to be experienced as a significant burden, which 
added to their already growing sense of stress and anxiety, suggesting an initial route to 
worry feeling problematic. 
 
Trying to make sense of worry 
Participants offered reflections upon their worrying, which seemed to involve a form of 
sense-making of the phenomenon. They referred to the undesirable and unpleasant aspects of 
worrying: that it was distracting, distressing and a drain on their ability to focus on other parts 
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of their lives. They also described how it often felt that it was not under their control or at 
times even within their sphere of influence, emerging and escalating unpredictably. Equally, 
participants talked of the perceived value of worry, for example that it helped to motivate, 
prepare and protect themselves for future threats. These contrasting perspectives on worry 
appeared to result in a dilemma for participants regarding their decision over whether they 
should be worrying or not. 
 
Previous studies into the experience of worry have produced results which are supported by 
these findings. There is evidence that worry does indeed have noxious effects, in terms of 
fatigue (Andrea, Beurskens, Kant, Davey, Field & van Schayck, 2004), negative emotions 
(Borkovec et al, 1998) and reduced concentration (Borkovec et al, 1983). It has also been 
reported numerous times (Borkovec et al, 1983; Davey, Tallis & Capuzzo, 1996; Francis & 
Dugas, 1994; Freeston et al, 1994; Hebert, Dugas, Tulloch & Holowka, 2014; Llera & 
Newman, 2014; Tallis et al, 1994) that those who experience high levels of worry hold 
negative beliefs about the consequences of worry. Similarly, a large number of studies have 
reported that high worriers endorse positive beliefs about worry (Borkovec & Roemer, 1995; 
Cartwright-Hatton & Wells, 1997; Craske, Rapee, Jackel & Barlow, 1989; Davey, Tallis & 
Capuzzo, 1996; Wells, 1994; 2005). 
 
Although a substantial proportion of the worry literature has explored the presence of beliefs 
about the uncontrollability of worry (Cartwright-Hatton & Wells, 1997; Wells, 1994; 2005), 
the current study contributes an additional layer of meaning to this. Participants spoke of 
worry being experienced almost as an external entity, functioning separately from the person, 
distanced from themselves in terms of initiation, ownership and responsibility. It appears that 
this can extend from an initial thought or image “popping up” unbidden, to the graphic 
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visualisation of worst case scenarios being re-enacted over and over, all out of the person’s 
awareness and control. There is a subtle but important degree of difference between this 
interpretation of excessive worry episodes and one in which individuals feel that they cannot 
stop themselves from worrying. 
 
Another aspect from the current study that appears not to have been previously delineated is 
the dilemma generated by holding conflicting beliefs about worry. It could be said that the 
existence of this dilemma is implicitly known from the fact that individuals have previously 
reported holding negative and positive beliefs about worry (Borkovec et al, 1983; Borkovec 
& Roemer, 1995; Cartwright-Hatton & Wells, 1997; Craske, Rapee, Jackel & Barlow, 1989; 
Davey, Tallis & Capuzzo, 1996; Francis & Dugas, 1994; Freeston et al, 1994; Hebert et al, 
2014; Llera & Newman, 2014; Tallis et al, 1994; Wells, 1994; 2005). However, past research 
has not explicitly reported on the conscious awareness of this dilemma, and as such the 
relevance of this quandary in understanding the phenomenon of worry has not been explored. 
Based on the participants’ accounts in the current study, the uncertainty and doubt that this 
dilemma appears to create is likely to feed back into the worry process and intensify the 
experience. 
 
Emphasizing the emotional component 
This category refers to the emphasis upon the emotional experience of worry that was 
detected in the participants’ narratives. This category incorporates not only descriptions of 
the distress and turmoil that worry involves but also the impression that this has not been 
acknowledged or has even been invalidated by others. 
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Similarly to previous research, this category highlights how negative emotions are associated 
with worry, in particular with anxiety (Andrews & Borkovec, 1988; Borkovec et al, 1983; 
York et al, 1987; Borkovec et al, 1998; Brown, Antony & Barlow, 1992; Cartwright-Hatton 
& Wells, 1997; Eysenck & van Berkum, 1992; Meyer et al, 1990; Mennin, Heimberg, Turk 
& Fresco, 2005) and low mood (Andrews & Borkovec, 1988; Borkovec et al, 1998; Brown et 
al, 1992; Mennin et al, 2005; York et al, 1987). 
 
The current study adds further value to the existing literature through the identification of the 
felt distress associated with worry, in which it is described as intense, unbearable and 
overwhelming. Furthermore, the present findings highlight the participants’ impression that 
their distress and struggle to cope is not recognised by others. It is possible that this causes or 
heightens a sense of isolation from those around them. This may result in an increased focus 
on anticipated threats, and on the nature and impact of worry, leading to further distress and 
negativity. 
 
Worry modifiers 
Participant’s descriptions of their experience of worry indicated that there were a number of 
factors influencing the extent and impact of their worrying. Those acting as escalators 
included isolation, being in an unsafe environment or remembering the debilitating effect of 
worry in the past; worry diffusers involved talking to trusted others, accessing therapy or 
utilising self-help strategies. There were also a number of short-term factors that participants 
indicated helped to reduce their worry, but which were portrayed as unhelpful in the long-run, 
such as over-eating, over-sleeping or seeking excessive reassurance. 
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There has been a great deal of research into worry in an attempt to understand and explain 
why worry can become problematic. However, this has tended to focus on psychological 
factors, such as meta-cognitions (Wells, 1995), intolerance of uncertainty (Dugas et al, 1997) 
or cognitive avoidance of emotion (Borkovec, 1994; Newman & Llera, 2011), and the 
benefits of therapeutic interventions linked to those factors (Borkovec, 2006; Robichaud & 
Dugas, 2006; Wells, 2006). It does not appear that there have been any other findings 
published regarding the role of proximal external factors in the escalation or amelioration of 
worry, of the sort identified by the current study. Such findings have obvious implications for 
how and why worry can escalate to problematic levels, and how such mechanisms could be 
reduced or harnessed through psychosocial interventions.  
 
Link to personal factors 
The final theoretical category was based upon participants’ references to personal factors that 
they felt were linked in some way to their experience of worry. Key among these were: 
recollections of distressing and sometimes traumatic events in their past; the presence of 
significant individuals in their lives who were described as worriers, or anxious and over-
protective; a perceived need for certainty, perfection and control; and that their worry was 
considered to be lifelong and almost part of their identity. 
 
Although the majority of research into worry has not tended to explore the personal histories 
of participants, there have been a limited number of studies that have focused on this area. 
Borkovec (1994) has briefly described investigations conducted by his research group, which 
indicated a significantly higher frequency of traumatic events among high worriers. In a later 
study, Roemer, Molina, Litz & Borkovec (1997) asked participants who worried excessively 
whether they had experienced any extremely distressing, life-threatening or traumatic events. 
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Participants reported a greater incidence of these types of events than controls. More recently, 
studies have found significant associations between individuals diagnosed with GAD and a 
range of distressing life experiences, such as sexual abuse, maltreatment and loss (Cougle, 
Timpano, Sachs-Ericsson, Keough & Riccardi, 2010; Moffitt et al, 2007; Nordahl, Wells, 
Olsson & Bjerkeset, 2010). The current study supports these findings and is the first attempt 
to identify a possible relationship between worry and distressing early-life experiences where 
open questions were utilised and participants themselves highlighted the potential link. 
 
In relation to the awareness of significant others who worry excessively, there do not appear 
to have been any studies that have specifically explored this. However, there has been 
research (Muris et al, 2000; Wijsbroek, Hale, Raaijmakers & Meeus, 2011) which has found 
associations between worry severity and avoidant, psychologically controlling or demanding 
parenting styles, which may indicate a tendency to worry among those parents. Previous 
studies (Tallis et al, 1991; Dugas et al, 1997) have also explored a possible connection 
between personality characteristics related to perfection, certainty and control, and excessive 
worry. Findings from these studies have found positive correlations, which the current study 
appears to support, based upon participants’ descriptions of a lifelong determination to attain 
perfection and control in many areas of their lives. 
 
Within this category, it seems that an original contribution relates to the participants’ 
descriptions of their worry being lifelong and feeling like it is part of their personality. The 
value of this finding is in its links with other theoretical categories, introduced above. It 
seems that the chronicity of participants’ worry contributed to the positive attitudes they 
expressed towards worry, in terms of it being instinctive and ‘normal’. However, it also 
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resulted in worry being viewed as inevitable and was therefore another reason why it did not 
feel under their control. 
 
A number of the elements from this theoretical category are potentially inter-related, and also 
have connections with other findings from the current study, specifically in relation to the 
extremes of emotion described by participants. It is possible that the prior experience of 
distressing events combined with the presence of anxious care-givers would contribute to a 
prevailing anxious atmosphere and world-view that life and/or others are threatening with the 
result that they need to prepare and protect themselves. It would be understandable if such 
precursors led individuals to “learn the utility of anticipating threat as a means of coping” 
(Nordahl et al, 2010, p856), with a particular focus on certainty, perfection and control to 
maximise the capacity to cope.  
 
Comparison between models 
The overall model of worry presented in the current study can be compared to the main 
theories and models that have previously been developed. The meta-cognitive model (Wells, 
1995) states that worry can become problematic due to the positive and negative beliefs that 
individuals might hold about worry. More specifically, the contention is that negative beliefs 
especially, such as that worry is uncontrollable and dangerous, lead to maladaptive strategies 
to control, suppress and reduce worry. These strategies are self-defeating and result in worry 
escalating. This has similarities with the current model. Participants expressed negative 
beliefs about worry, particularly that it is uncontrollable. As described above, the nature of 
this uncontrollability also involved the sense that worry at times functioned as a separate 
entity, entirely out of the participant’s zone of awareness and control. On those occasions, 
participants did not describe worry suppression. Here participants reported trying to escape 
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from the experience itself, through a number of avoidance strategies. The other aspect that 
differs from the meta-cognitive model is that the existence of positive and negative beliefs 
about worry seemed to lead to a dilemma, as outlined above, which created anxiety and 
frustration for participants, ultimately feeding back into the worry process. Finally, the 
metacognitive model of worry (2006) suggests that it is not necessary or helpful to explore 
the background or personal history of individuals who report significant levels of worry. This 
contrasts with the findings from the current study which revealed that participants’ histories 
contained highly relevant information about distressing past experiences. These experiences 
may be particularly important for understanding why worry has become problematic. 
 
The intolerance of uncertainty theory (Dugas et al, 1997) suggests that a dispositional 
aversion to uncertainty leads to worry developing to problematic levels. With such an 
aversion, individuals are considered to utilise worry to increase certainty and avoid the 
perceived consequences of uncertainty. However, the strived for certainty is rarely achieved 
due to the excessive focus upon the problem rather than on the solution, or that because a 
solution simply does not exist. The current model also indicates that participants view 
worrying, in part, as a way of increasing certainty which seems forever out of reach due to 
overwhelming intensity of the escalating worry experience. This model also suggests that the 
search for certainty is not necessarily driven by an intolerance of uncertainty per se, but rather 
by the belief that certainty will prepare and protect them from vulnerabilities associated with 
distressing early life experiences. 
 
The mood-as-input hypothesis (Startup & Davey, 2001) understands worry as a problem-
solving activity, which escalates due to an interaction between mood and specific rules 
regarding the amount of worrying that should take place. Effectively, worry is felt to become 
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problematic when an individual experiences a negative mood at the same time as believing 
they should worry as much as possible. If they use their mood as a guide to whether they 
have found a satisfactory solution, a concurrent negative mood would predict the individual 
would continue worrying to exhaustion. In a similar way, the current model identifies worry 
as a strategy for solving problems, in terms of identifying and preparing for anticipated threat. 
Furthermore, the presence of positive beliefs about worry would suggest that informal rules 
exist around needing to worry as much as possible. However, rather than the negative 
emotion influencing the selection of a solution, the current model appears to suggest that the 
negative emotion instead affects the assessment of the threat, which seems to become more 
real and overwhelming as their emotion escalates. 
 
Finally, both the cognitive avoidance model (Borkovec, 1994) and the contrast avoidance 
model (Newman & Llera, 2011) focus upon the role of emotion in the maintenance of worry. 
The former states that worry is used by individuals to avoid the experience of emotion in 
relation to a perceived threat, which prevents emotional processing and threat desensitisation 
from taking placing; the latter contends that worry does actually generate emotion, but that 
this occurs in order to avoid a feared contrast of emotion, in the face of an anticipated threat. 
Emotionality is also a key feature of the model from the current study, and it appears to hold 
more similarities with the contrast avoidance model, in the identification of significant 
emotion generated throughout the worry process. However, the current model does not 
specifically indicate that this emotion is deliberately created in order to avoid a contrast, 
although this may be an additional factor in the process. Instead, the current model suggests 
that the emotion is generated as a consequence of triggers associated with earlier distressing 
events, along with the worry process feeling out of control and the uncertainty of the dilemma 
over whether to worry or not.  
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It may also be possible that the emotion becomes intense due to difficulties with individuals’ 
emotion regulation abilities. Research has been conducted into attachment styles and worry, 
which has indicated increased reports of insecure attachments with care-givers among high 
worriers (Borkovec, Ray & Stober, 1998; Brown & Whiteside, 2008; Cassidy, Lichtenstein-
Phelps, Sibrava, Thomas & Borkovec, 2009; Hale, Engels & Meeus, 2006; Mickelson, 
Kessler & Shaver,1997; Muris, Meesters, Merckelbach & Paulette, 2000; Warren, Huston, 
Egeland & Sroufe, 1997). The descriptions from participants about their early-life 
experiences and interactions with care-givers would suggest the possibility of insecure 
attachments. A particular advantage conferred by the formation of secure attachments is 
considered to be the ability to self-regulate emotions (Mikulincer, Shaver & Pereg, 2003; 
Schore & Schore, 2008; Sroufe, 2000). According to the current model, the worry process 
appears to involve an initial activation of emotion due to the presence of a distressing trigger. 
If there was then a reduced capacity to regulate emotions, this may explain why the emotion 
escalates to distressing and overwhelming levels. 
 
Clinical implications 
The main clinical implication of this research relates to the apparent influence of distressing 
life events and attachment difficulties on the development and maintenance of excessive 
worry. This indicates that conducting a detailed psychological formulation with individuals 
who experience significant worry would be recommended. At the very least, this would 
enable the person to understand the potential links between the past events and relationships 
in terms of their experience of excessive worry. They would then be able to explore these in 
an attempt to express any suppressed emotions and resolve any underlying conflicts. Such an 
approach would appear to run contrary to current therapeutic interventions recommended for 
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individuals experiencing excessive worry (Wells, 2009) in which the focus is more around 
attention training techniques to facilitate greater control over worry rather than exploring any 
historical factors that may be implicated. A detailed psychological formulation would also 
potentially reveal specific worry modifiers, which the current study suggests are relevant in 
the escalation or amelioration of worry and the problems it can create. Identifying these 
worry modifiers may enable idiosyncratic treatment plans to be developed for individuals to 
support them to reduce the impact that worry has on their lives. 
 
A further clinical implication of the current study concerns the possible connection between 
the maintenance of excessive worry and emotion regulation difficulties. Based upon this 
finding, it would appear that interventions aimed at helping individuals to either tolerate or 
reduce emotions may reduce the reliance upon worry as a coping strategy. In addition to 
therapeutic programmes directed specifically at enabling individuals to develop emotional 
regulation skills (i.e. Leahy, Tirch & Napolitano, 2011), there are also techniques found 
within approaches such as Mindfulness (Williams & Penman, 2011), Acceptance and 
Commitment Therapy (Hayes, Strosahl & Wilson, 1999) and Dialectical Behaviour Therapy 
(McKay, Wood & Brantley, 2007) which can help individuals to decentre, tolerate, regulate 
and experientially embrace doubt, uncertainty and uncomfortable affect. It is also possible 
that through the psychological formulation of their difficulties, individuals would be able to 
make sense of and resolve any feelings of invalidation that may be implicated in their 
emotion dysregulation and worry episodes. Furthermore, disclosing and discussing their 
feelings with trusted others may provide a more functional strategy for coping with 
overwhelming emotions, which a number of the participants reported as being beneficial 
when they felt able to do it. It is likely that supporting people to recognise the control they 
can reclaim over their worry would be helpful (Wells, 2009), however this may be less 
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important if they are able to regulate their emotions before the worry process escalates to 
levels that feel out of their control or awareness. 
 
Methodological critique 
The use of a robust qualitative methodology enabled a deeper level of understanding to be 
obtained regarding the experience of worry. This is most clearly evident in participants’ 
account of the overwhelming emotionality of worry and how they felt that this was not 
recognised or appreciated by others, but can also be seen in the identification of the dilemma 
of worry, as well as the experience of worry as an inevitable, external entity. 
 
However, there are limitations to the current study, the first of which relates to the extent of 
the participants’ worries. In order to recruit a sample that were experiencing worry at the 
upper end of the continuum, in terms of frequency, intensity and impact, the inclusion criteria 
required participants to indicate that they were unable to stop or control their worrying, and 
that they worried too much about different things, for more than half the days over the 
previous two weeks. However, there is the possibility that participants did not attend fully to 
the latter question, and that their responses were related more to the ‘worrying too much’ 
component rather than ‘different things’. For a number of the participants, there were 
repeated references to worries that appeared to be linked to their diagnoses, such as OCD or 
health anxiety. Although these participants did also express more generalised worries, it may 
have been advisable to have incorporated a more detailed screening interview into the 
recruitment process to ensure that all participants worried generally, rather than about a 
focussed area of concern. 
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Another potential problem relates to the fact that all participants had received some form of 
therapy prior to taking part in the study. It is possible that in the course of this therapy, they 
would have been exposed to interventions linked to particular models of worry, such as the 
meta-cognitive model (Wells, 2005). As such, participants’ understanding of their worry may 
have been influenced by these models, and therefore could have influenced the findings.  
 
A further limitation that may be raised involves the use of grounded theory as the chosen 
methodology for the study. It could be argued that an approach such as IPA would have been 
more appropriate, given its subjectivist standpoint and emphasis on interpretation, meaning 
and understanding of individual lived experiences (Smith & Osborn, 2008). However, it was 
felt that the constructivist variant of grounded theory was more suitable, since not only is it 
positioned “squarely within the interpretative tradition” (Charmaz, 2006a, p130), but also 
because grounded theory is the only qualitative methodology which enables the development 
of a theoretical model of the experiences being explored, which was an explicit aim of the 
current study. 
 
Finally, there is possible issue over the selection of the term worry as the focus for the study, 
since it is far from clear that ‘worry’ actually relates to a unified and universal concept that 
refers to the same thing for all people. Positivist research over the last thirty years has 
resulted in worry being treated as if it exists in reality, in such a way that it can be 
experimentally induced, manipulated and measured. This has led to ‘worry’ being posited as 
a discrete symptom of a number of diagnoses, most notably GAD. By using a social 
constructivist qualitative methodology, it was hoped that assumptions related to the positivist 
paradigm would be resisted. But in using the term worry to name the study, recruit 
participants and frame questions, a potential unintended consequence is that worry being a 
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‘real’ entity or symptom has been reinforced, thus inadvertently biasing the nature of the 
investigation. Hopefully, even if this is the case, highlighting this fact will enable any 
interpretations of the findings to be balanced accordingly. 
 
Future Research 
As the current study recruited participants from a clinical sample, it would be recommended 
that further qualitative research be conducted with an analogue population, with individuals 
who report significant levels of worry but who have not been referred to mental health 
services. Such research may offer further support for the current study and enhance the theory 
that has thus far been developed. It would also be helpful if future studies specifically 
excluded participants who have received psychological support in relation to their worrying, 
which as discussed above, may have influenced the findings of the current study. 
In recent years, worry has begun to be viewed as part of the transdiagnostic process of 
negative repetitive thinking, within the same domain as rumination and mind-wandering 
(Ehring & Watkins, 2008; Ehring, Zetsche, Weidacker, Wahl, Schonfeld & Ehlers, 2011; 
Segerstrom, Tsao, Alden & Craske, 2000; Watkins, 2008). In this context, it would be 
interesting and potentially revealing to discover if any of the themes identified in the current 
study would be found in a qualitative study focused more broadly around the experience of 
negative repetitive thought.  
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Conclusion 
Ultimately, the reflections provided by participants indicate that a number of different factors 
may be involved in worry developing into an activity which is perceived as increasingly 
distressing, persistent and confusing. There appear to be many historic and personal features 
that are shared by participants. The role of distressing life experiences and attachment 
difficulties is arguably the most significant finding of this study. This has important clinical 
implications in relation to supporting individuals who indicate that worrying is a significant 
difficulty for them. This relates to an increased focus on psychological formulation and 
enhancing emotion regulation skills. Finally, it is important to emphasise that the theory 
resulting from the current study is only an interpretation of the participants’ experience of 
worry, rather than a positivist construction of the mechanisms involved in an objective, 
directly observable process. 
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Constructivist Grounded Theory 
 
Positivism is a form of ontology which considers there to be an objective, singular reality, 
accessible through sensory and scientific exploration. Research based on this ontological 
stance would be interested in discrete, measurable variables in order to substantiate or falsify 
a particular positivist theory, which “seeks causes, favors deterministic explanations, and 
emphasizes generality and universality” (Charmaz, 2006a, p126). Broadly speaking, research 
studies utilising a quantitative methodology would involve this type of approach. By the 
middle of the twentieth century, positivism and quantitative research dominated in the field of 
social sciences, and it was in this climate that Glaser and Strauss (1967) developed and 
introduced grounded theory. They sought to create a methodology which would allow for the 
production of theories that were grounded in the data without the influence of pre-existing 
theories or assumptions. The methodology provided a number of key strategies which 
enabled the researcher to stay close to the data and at the same time generate a coherent 
theory of social processes. These strategies included the concurrent collection and analysis of 
data, constant comparison of data, codes and categories throughout the analysis process, and 
the use of memos to elaborate and refine ideas, concepts and relationships.  
 
Since the release of their seminal publication, The Discovery of Grounded Theory, Glaser and 
Strauss took the methodology in different directions. Glaser (1978) espoused a positivist slant 
and held onto to the traditional tenets of the approach, while Strauss, in collaboration with 
Juliet Corbin (Strauss & Corbin, 1990; 1994), ‘evolved’ grounded theory, incorporating a 
range of new techniques while taking a more relativist stance to the nature of reality being 
studied (Mills, Bonner & Francis, 2006). However, while it is felt that there is some 
ambiguity over the truly ‘relativist credentials’ of Strauss and Corbin as they do not embed it 
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into the description of their methods, the same cannot be said to be true of Kathy Charmaz. In 
her writings (2000, 2006a, 2006b), she places her relativist conviction in the forefront and 
throughout her approach to grounded theory, explicitly using the label “constructivist 
grounded theory” (Charmaz, 2006a, p130). The title relates to the philosophy of social 
constructivism, which states that what is taken for ‘reality’ in the social domain is a 
construction from the discourses that exist in the different strata of society. A key element, as 
this relates to grounded theory, is the role of the researcher, that the resulting theory “depends 
on the researcher’s view: it does not and cannot stand outside of it” (Charmaz, 2006a, p130). 
It is the combination of the researchers’ and participants’ views, with the meaning they 
construct, that leads to the resulting theory being considered an ‘interpretation’, which 
provides an understanding, rather than an explanation, of the area being studied.  
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Participant Information Sheet 
 
 
Study title: An exploration into the personal experience of worry 
 
Researcher: Richard Britton (Trainee Clinical Psychologist) 
You are being invited to take part in a research study. Before you decide whether to participate, it is 
important for you to understand why the research is being done and what it would involve for you. 
One of our team will go through the information sheet with you and answer any questions you have. 
We’d suggest this should take about 15 minutes. 
 
Talk to others about the study if you wish. 
 
What is the purpose of the study? 
Worry has been identified as a problem that many people suffer. It is also thought to be a major factor 
in a number of mental health conditions. This study aims to develop a theory about the possible 
function, causes and consequences of worry, based upon interviews conducted with people who have 
reported it as being a significant problem in their lives. The interviews will focus on their personal 
experience and understanding of worry. 
 
Why have I been invited to participate? 
You have been chosen to take part in this study because you have indicated that you are currently 
experiencing mental health difficulties and also that you are worrying about lots of things and are 
finding this hard to control. There will be approximately 14 other people involved in the study who 
have also reported these types of difficulties. 
 
Do I have to take part? 
It is up to you to decide whether or not to join the study. We will describe the study and go through 
this information sheet. If you agree to take part, we will then ask you to sign a consent form. You are 
free to withdraw at any time, without giving a reason. This would not affect the standard of care you 
receive. 
 
What will happen if I decide to take part? 
A date and time of your convenience will be arranged for you to meet with a member of the research 
team in a private room within the health service building. You will be interviewed by the researcher 
about your personal experience and understanding of worry. The interview will be recorded on an 
audio recorder and will last no longer than one hour. The audio recording of your interview will then be 
transcribed into text format by myself or by a University of Liverpool approved transcriber. 
 
Expenses and payments 
We will reimburse you for any reasonable travel or parking expenses you incur while travelling to and 
from the interview. We will also give you a £5 Amazon gift voucher as a ‘thank-you’ for participating in 
the study. 
 
What will I have to do? 
You will be required to attend the arranged meeting and spend up to one hour discussing, with a 
researcher, your personal experience and understanding of worry. 
 
What are the possible disadvantages and risks of taking part? 
While there are no physical risks involved in this study, it is possible that you may find it 
uncomfortable or upsetting when discussing your personal experience and understanding of worry. If 
this happens, you will have the option to suspend or terminate the interview, and the researcher will 
be available to offer support during or after the interview should you request it. 
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What are the possible benefits of taking part? 
It is possible that by discussing your personal experience and understanding of worry, you will gain a 
better insight into the nature of the problem. However, we cannot promise the study will help you 
directly but the information we get from this study will help our understanding of worry, which may 
improve the treatment received by people suffering from this problem. 
 
What if there is a problem? 
If you are unhappy, or if there is a problem, please feel free to let us know by contacting Dr James 
Reilly at The University of Liverpool on 0151 794 5534 or jreilly@liverpool.ac.uk and we will try to 
help. If you remain unhappy or have a complaint which you feel you cannot come to us with then you 
should contact the Research Governance Officer on 0151 794 8290 (ethics@liv.ac.uk). When 
contacting the Research Governance Officer, please provide details of the name or description of the 
study (so that it can be identified), the researcher(s) involved, and the details of the complaint you 
wish to make. 
 
What will happen if I don’t want to carry on with the study? 
You can withdraw from the study at any point. If you withdraw during or after the interview process, 
we will still need to use any interview recorded up to that point for analysis purposes. 
 
Will my taking part in this study be kept confidential? 
All information that is collected about you will be kept strictly confidential, unless you disclose any 
information which suggests you or someone you know may be at risk of harm. In this case, we would 
aim to discuss our concerns with you first before taking any further action. 
If you decide to take part in the study, you will be allocated a participant number. Your name and 
participant number will be recorded in a password protected computer file, which will be stored in a 
folder on a University of Liverpool computer server. This folder will only be accessible to the research 
team supervisor, via secure login. 
 
Only your allocated participant number will be recorded on the audio and transcription files of your 
interview. Your name will not be used in the subsequent analysis or research report. In this way, your 
anonymity will be ensured. The audio and transcription files of your interview will be stored on a 
password-protected computer system, which will be stored in a secure environment. Only members of 
the research team will have access to the audio and transcription files of your interview. All data will 
be retained until the completion of the research report (approximately September 2014), after which 
time it will be destroyed. 
 
What will happen to the results of the research study? 
The research report will be submitted in partial fulfilment of the Clinical Psychology Doctorate. It is 
also hoped that the research report will be published in an academic journal. If you would like a copy 
of the research report or published journal article, please indicate this on the consent form. 
 
Who is organising and funding the research? 
This research is being sponsored and funded by the University of Liverpool. 
 
Who has reviewed the study? 
All research in the NHS is looked at by an independent group of people, called a Research Ethics 
Committee, to protect your interests. This study has been reviewed and given favourable opinion by 
North West NHS Research Ethics Committee. 
 
Further information and contact details 
If you would like to contact the researcher to discuss any aspect of the research please leave a 
message with the secretary at the University of Liverpool on 0151 794 5530 with your name and 
contact details. Alternatively, you can contact me via e-mail on rbritton@liverpool.ac.uk  
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Thank you for taking time to read this information sheet and for considering being involved in 
the study 
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Patient Identification Number for this trial: 
CONSENT FORM 
Title of Project: An exploration into the personal experience of worry 
 
Name of Researcher: Dr James Reilly 
Please initial all boxes  
1. I confirm that I have read and understand the information sheet dated 5
th
 March 2013 (v2.0) 
for the above study.  I have had the opportunity to consider the information, ask questions and 
have had these answered satisfactorily. 
   
2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any time 
without giving any reason, without my medical care or legal rights being affected. 
 
3. I agree to my interview being recorded on an audio recorder 
 
4. I agree to take part in the above study. 
 
5. I understand that relevant data collected during the study, may be looked at by individuals from 
the University of Liverpool, from regulatory bodies or from the NHS Trust, where it is relevant 
to my taking part in this research. I give permission for these individuals to have access to this 
data. 
 
6. I would like a copy of the final report of the study   
 
 
            
Name of Participant   Date    Signature 
                                
            
Name of Person   Date    Signature  
taking consent.  
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1. Tell me about your experience of worrying 
 
2. Can you describe what happens when you worry 
 
3. How long have you experienced it in this way 
 
4. Do you remember a time that you didn’t ever worry 
 
5. What does worry mean to you/what do you associate with worrying 
 
6. How does worrying make you feel 
 
7. How do you cope with worrying (if described negatively) 
 
8. How do you know when you are worrying 
 
9. Is there anything that changes how you worry, and/or how you experience worry? 
 
 Do you have any ideas about why? 
 
10. Is there anything that affects whether you worry/any periods of your life where 
you have worried more/less 
 
 Do you have any ideas about why? 
 
11. When do you tend to worry 
 
12. Do you have any thoughts on why you worry 
 
13. Does worrying affect your life 
 
14. What do you think other people say about worrying 
 
15. Are there things that make you worry more 
 
16. Are there things that make you worry less 
 
17. What do you like most about worrying 
 
18. What do you like least about worrying 
 
19. Would you like to stop worrying 
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1. Tell me about your experience of worrying 
 
2. Can you describe what happens when you worry (use a recent example). How do you 
know when you are worrying? 
 Does a worry episode sometimes start with you intentionally thinking worry 
thoughts (what if’s, doubts, etc) and then change? Is this motivated by positive 
beliefs 
 Is worry emotional (anxiety) and cognitive (what if’s, future-orientated, doubts, 
etc)? 
 When the worrying is intense, does it worry you even more how you will cope 
with future challenges thinking/feeling like that? 
 When the worry thoughts feel not under your control/ownership, does that make it 
feel more intense/distressing? 
 
3. How long have you experienced it in this way 
 Do you associate (your) worrying with your identity? – would you experience a 
sense of loss/void if it were to disappear/you were to let it go? 
 Do you feel your worrying is linked to early-life experiences? Did these create a 
sense of vulnerability/isolation? 
 Is there a sense that your prior/on-going distress is ‘unheard’ and/or that you 
can’t share it with others for fear of rejection/abandonment? 
 
4. How does worrying make you feel 
 Do you feel people underemphasise the emotional impact/source of your 
worrying? 
 When the worrying is intense, does it worry you even more how you will cope 
with future challenges thinking/feeling like that? 
 When the negative emotion builds, does that feel mentally disorientating? 
 When the worrying is intense, does it worry you even more how you will cope 
with future challenges thinking/feeling like that? 
 
5. Would you like to stop worrying? 
 Do you experience a sense of responsibility/blame for continuing to worry? 
 Do you feel in two minds as to whether you should or shouldn’t worry? 
 
6. How do you cope with worrying (if described negatively) 
 When you try to control/reduce your worry, does it sometimes make the worry 
worse? 
 
7. Is there anything that changes how/whether you worry? Any periods of your life where 
you have worried more/less? 
 Do you feel under pressure to suppress/hide your emotions/worry? Does that 
change with trusted others? 
 When the worrying is intense, does it worry you even more how you will cope 
with future challenges thinking/feeling like that? 
 
8. Do you have any thoughts on why you worry 
 Do you feel you (are right to) worry in part, because other people did/do it? 
 Are there secondary benefits to worry? 
 Does thinking during a worry episode feel like it helps to reduce the anxiety? 
 
9. Does anyone else you know worry 
 Do you feel you (are right to) worry in part, because other people did/do it? 
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Worry being distressing/real because of how the person feels (anxious) 
Worry has been described as distressing because of how intense and troubling the initial worry feels 
when it comes into the persons head, in addition to, or rather than, being distressing because of the 
process of worrying (feeling out of control, persistent, ubiquitous, etc). Is this linked to the idea that 
worry can feel like it is due to a ‘real threat’ rather than an ‘illusory’ threat? Also connected to the 
reality-testing that worrying sometimes seems to involve? 
Some participants have also spoken about a worry thought seeming real because of the anxiety they 
are experiencing at the same time, whereas when the anxiety has dissipated, the thought no longer 
seems relevant. Linked as well maybe to statements about “living it in my head”? Is this because the 
anxiety reduces the ‘evidence threshold’ for believing something is true, so that as the person 
thinks/images more and more catastrophic scenarios and gets more and more anxious, they feel 
more and more real?? 
 
Worry making me a more caring (not bad) person 
Some participants have defended the instinctive value of worry due to its perceived ability to make 
them more caring or thoughtful of others, and that if worry didn’t exist/that other people who don’t 
worry become selfish and uncaring of other people. Seems to be linked to the idea of responsibility 
and the dread of getting it wrong & offending or upsetting others, which I suppose ultimately affects 
their vulnerability. 
 
Worry providing secondary gain 
There is a sense that worry, while distressing in itself, may provide a secondary gain: self-
punishment for, distraction from other more painful/distressing aspects of the person’s life. 
Whether this is a primary or secondary gain is unclear. SCRATCHING AN ITCH 
In relation to being a distraction, this is yet another example of worry acting on two levels: 
participants complain about worry being distracting, affecting their concentration, but then also 
conceding that the distraction is a good thing (and hence they might be doing it intentionally to 
distract themselves) as it stops them having to deal with other, more distressing things – even 
though they are not certain that the distress the distraction causes compensates for the distressing 
thing they are trying to distract themselves from – it seems that the secondary gain is while the 
worry is relatively tolerable, but when it escalates completely out of control, that’s when the 
secondary gain is overridden by the distress of the worry 
Worry almost like an addiction, especially in relation to the intermittent positive reinforcement that 
some participants have spoken (but it sometimes works…) and the sense of it being bottled 
up/suppressed, only to burst through anyway, or for the worry to initiated because “the urge was 
only going to get worse/it was going to build and build and happen anyway”. 
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 DIAGRAM 1 
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 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  
Male           
Female           
<30           
>30           
Primary care           
Secondary care           
Some form of traumatic/distressing 
experience in past 
 Acute external event 
 Health scare 
 Chronic interpersonal event (esp 
abandonment/rejection) 
 Traumatic lack of coping 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Lifelong (anxiety, worry)           
Part of personality           
Disconcerting without worry           
Everybody worries/worry can be 
normal/natural/instinct 
          
It’s worse for me (now/than others)           
Emphasizing the emotional component           
The worry (emotion or thought) means 
something important (hidden/real threat) 
          
Focus of worry becomes real/a ‘thing’, 
(partly) due to how it feels 
          
Seriously dwell/obsess           
Catastrophising           
Feeling like worry can be out of their 
control/forced on them/unpredictable 
 
 
         
Persistent diseased inevitable machine           
Worrying about the consequences of 
worry (esp meltdown) – how will I cope? 
          
Worry done deliberately/self-blame           
Stupid/pointless           
Perfectionistic traits           
Need to prove self  
 Meet external expectations 
 Avoid negative evaluation 
 Resolving imposed worries 
 Unclear source 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Positive (compulsive) beliefs about worry 
 Protects/warns me 
 Prepares me 
 Motivates me 
 Keeps me caring/responsible 
 Makes me insightful 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Positive (reflective) beliefs about worry 
 Provides control 
 Provides distraction 
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
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 Provides self-punishment  
Negative consequences of worry 
 Mentally disorientating/draining 
 Emotional distress 
 Physical symptoms/strain 
 Existential thinking (& cop strat) 
 Avoiding life – isolation, sleeping, 
overeating, drinking (& cop strat) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dilemma/confusing – what should I do?           
Feeling that distress/emotions are 
unheard/suppressed 
          
Feeling alone/different           
Hiding/bottling up worry/anxiety/distress 
– fear that it may spill out/be judged 
          
Wanting worry to be validated/seen as 
having a real/genuine/justified source 
          
Experience/fear of social/physical threat           
Worry role models           
Negative worry modifiers 
 Increased work/pressure 
 Problems out of my control 
 Battling/blocking worry 
 Seek reassurance 
 Unsafe environment 
 Frantically keeping busy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Positive worry modifiers 
 With/talking to trusted others 
 Therapy/Self-help 
 Structuring time 
 Safe environment 
 Time/space to think (but can 
become neg.) 
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 
Intermittent positive reinforcement           
Questioning/searching for a solution/ 
evidence if the threat is real or not 
          
The urge to worry will just grow so get it 
out of the way – like an addiction 
          
Finding worry confusing           
Worry (thought or feeling) like intrusions           
 
 
